Saturday, October 29, 2005

Design for Survival excerpt #5: Tactics

In trying to predict bomber attrition rates, one of the most important contributing factors is frequently overlooked, that is, the unpredictable factor of tactics. I maintain that the commander and his tactics, more than anything else, determine the losses in any offensive action. The flexibility in SAC's penetration tactics makes it possible to hold those losses to a minimum by affording a wide choice of strategies.

Thomas S. Power's Design for Survival Page 172

Index of Power

CINCSAC newsgroups

sci.military(archived 2004),

Managing Nuclear Operations (1987), ex-CINCSAC General Dougherty

U.S.C. 155(e) and 163(b)
categorically provide that the JCS chairman cannot issue orders

"Communications are the nervous system of the entire SAC organization,
and their protection is therefore, of the greatest importance. I like
to say that without communications, all I control is my desk, and that
is not a very lethal weapon." Gen. T.S. Power, CINCSAC, May 1959
#57-2589. It is a KC-135E, but has plenty of EC-135 ABNCP stuff on the
inside. It was the CINCSAC aircraft,
SAC Museum

Friday, October 28, 2005

Hot-rod parameters

Project Orion, Page 150

2.3 pound charges
230 lb craft
100:1 mass ratio per pulse
distance about 5r see video

July 5, 1960:The Committee recommended that Orion project be turned over to NASA

image from

July 5, 1960

The House Committee on Science and Astronautics declared: "A high priority program should be undertaken to place a manned expedition on the moon in this decade. A firm plan with this goal in view should be drawn up and submitted to the Congress by NASA. Such a plan, however, should be completely integrated with other goals, to minimize total costs. The modular concept deserves close study. Particular attention should be paid immediately to long lead-time phases of such a program." The Committee also recommended that development of the F-1 engine be expedited in expectation of the Nova launch vehicle, that there be more research on nuclear engines and less conventional engines before freezing the Nova concept, and that the Orion project be turned over to NASA. It was the view of the Committee that "NASA's 10-year program is a good program, as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. Furthermore the space program is not being pushed with sufficient energy."

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Space, Missiles, and the Nation, 86th Congress, 2nd Session (1960), pp. 55-56.

Ostrander vs. Finger, the frontier is delayed

Harold B. Finger:

Don [R.] Ostrander came in, and I
think he was there for a couple of years anyway, a very able guy. He
headed the program, spoke a lot on nuclear rockets, and so on. Incidentally, he came from the Defense Department and had
headed, in the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Orion Project,
which is the bomb propulsion project. When he came-in fact, I have the book on that-when he came, he asked NASA to take it over, suggested that NASA take it over, and he asked me to lead a team to go
out and review the program, which I did. We had meetings out at
General Atomics. This guy, Ted Taylor, was busy working the program, and Freeman Dyson, a top
scientist, who was, and I
guess still is, at Princeton, was in charge of it, and it's George
Dyson, his son, who wrote that

I came to the conclusion that it was a nonusable concept, and in the
meeting, I said, "Look, I can tell you what our report's going to say. We haven't
written it yet, obviously. I see no way of testing it, actually. You may talk about testing it in flight, but nobody is going to take
the chance of putting up a system that has not gone through extensive
ground testing before you
take the risk of putting it to flight and not knowing what'll happen.
And I know no place where
you could do the ground testing. I also know no place where you could
do a launch-," because
they were talking about ground launch, things like that. So,
fundamentally, I killed the program,
and that was in about '61 or '62, while Ostrander was there.
The issue kept coming up. In '63 NASA put a little money into it
because George [E.]
Mueller and some of the people on the Space Flight thought maybe it's
worth looking at, and
they wanted to set up an organization to study nuclear propulsion and
the alternatives, and I said,
"I see no reason to waste our time studying that one." And that's the
way it ended up. I've
pulled together a lot of background paper. There's one that I can't
fi d in the NASA History
Office, which troubles me, and that's a paper that I wrote rejecting
the concept. The original report. I can't find that report anyplace. So it may still be classified, for all I know. But
anyway, that was the situation.

Why "Peak Oil" makes no sense

Here's the situation. The world has 531 billion barrels of oil in reserve. The world consumes 16.5 billion barrels of oil annually. When will the oil run out? When will the last barrel be pumped and there won't be anymore?

lunar PGM[1] mining?

"major sources of PGMs on Earth, such as Sudbury in Canada and sites in South Africa, have been linked to asteroid impacts. The Moon’s lower gravity would mean slower impacts, making it more likely that significant portions of asteroids could survive."

via Lunar Soil

Platinum Palladium Rhodium
Iridium Osmium Ruthenium

Image from

Protect your hips

Mission control: "Yes. Make sure you protect your hips."

Major General Don Richard Ostrander at ARDC and NASA during the Orion era

"General Ostrander's next assignment was as director of development at Headquarters Air Research and Development Command, Baltimore, Md., and in September 1955 he was designated assistant deputy commander for weapon systems, Headquarters ARDC, which moved to Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. In May 1957 he became deputy commander for resources, Headquarters ARDC, a position he held until August 1958.

The general was then appointed assistant for guided missiles production with the NATO International Staff, Paris, France and in October 1959 returned to the United States as deputy director of Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, located in the Pentagon.

From October 1959 until August 1961 General Ostrander was director of the Office of Launch Vehicles, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington and in September 1961 became vice commander, Ballistic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, Los Angeles, Calif. "

Vampires aspire

Man rated coffins?

Jackass Flats circa 1961

Nerva photo archive

Map of the launch effects

DOE on the Mars mission

Thursday, October 27, 2005

Orion designs compared to launch fireballs #3

1.25 seconds

Index and Fireball images #1 .1ms to .94 ms

Orion 1.11 for Orbiter is out!

At orbithangar

Use it for animation,
a look at the new NASA designs,
DSBF contemplation,
or more combat.

Other simulators

Tuesday, October 25, 2005