NDEW 1989

Nuclear (Atomic) Directed Energy Weapon Research:

-------------------------------------------------

(FONSI) AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY RESEARCH FACILITY AT LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY RESEARCH FACILITY LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA

Environmental Assessment Nuclear Directed Energy Research Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

PREFACE

1. INTRODUCTION

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED PROJECT AND ALTERNATIVES

2.1 Purpose and Need
2.2 Project Location
2.3 Proposed Design
2.4 Relationship of the Proposed Project to Other Activities at LLNL
2.5 Alternatives to the Proposed Project
2.5.1 No Action
2.5.2 Perform the NDERF Mission in an Existing but Modified Facility
2.5.3 Construct NDERF at an Alternative LLNL Livermore Site
2.5.4 Construct NDERF at an Alternative DOE Site
2.5.5 Construct and Operate the Preferred Alternative

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING ENVIRONMENT

3.1 Geography and Geology
3.2 Seismicity
3.3 Climate and Air Quality
3.4 Water Use
3.5 Vegetation and Wildlife
3.6 Cultural and Historical Resources
3.7 Population and Land Use

4. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED OPERATIONS

4.1 Chemical Operations
4.2 Engineering Operations
4.3 Chemical and Hazardous Waste Storage
4.4 Emergency Preparedness/Response Plan

5. EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES ON THE ENVIRONMENT

5.1 EFFECTS OF THE NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE
5.2 EFFECTS OF PERFORMING THE NDERF MISSION IN AN EXISTING BUT MODIFIED FACILITY
5.3 EFFECTS OF CONSTRUCTING NDERF AT AN ALTERNATIVE LLNL LIVERMORE SITE
5.4 EFFECTS OF CONSTRUCTING AND OPERATING NDERF AT AN ALTERNATIVE DOE SITE
5.5 EFFECTS OF THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE
5.5.1 Routine Releases
5.5.1.1 Parts-Cleaning Operations
5.5.1.2 Fugitive Chemical Releases
5.5.2 Accident-Related Releases
5.5.2.1 Radiological Exposure of Workers or the Public
5.5.2.2 Toxic Metal Releases
5.5.2.3 Fluorine Gas Releases
5.5.3 General Operations
5.5.3.1 Growth-Inducing Impacts
5.5.3.2 Central Plant Emissions
5.5.3.3 Construction Activities
5.5.3.4 Hazardous Waste Generation
5.5.3.5 Potential Effects on LLNL Personnel
5.5.3.6 Use of Resources
5.5.3.6.1 Utility Systems
5.5.3.6.2 Land Use
5.6 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS

6. REFERENCES

7. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

APPENDIX A PPLICABLE ORDERS, CODES, NATIONAL STANDARDS, LLNL STANDARDS and GUIDES

Appendix B. Classified Information
List of Figures

Figure 1-1. Area map showing the location of the proposed Nuclear Directed Energy Research Facility (NDERF) and Nuclear Test Technology Complex (NTTC) at the Livermore Site

Figure 2.2-1. Location of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Figure 2.2-2. Area map showing the location of the proposed Nuclear Directed Energy Research Facility (NDERF) within the NDERF/NTTC Planning Area at the Livermore Site

Figure 3.7-1. Zoning in the vicinity of LLNL
List of Tables

Table 4.1-1. Standard organic solvents to be used routinely in NDERF operations

Table 4.2-1. Radioactive sources used in calibration operations

Table 5.5.1.2-1. Chemicals identified as air toxics and their estimated release rates

Table 5.5.1.2-2. Dispersion modeling input parameters and unitized output for estimation of risk from fugitive releases

Table 5.5.1.2-3. Estimates of annual average concentrations and risk associated wi NDERF chemical operations

Table 5.5.2.1-1. Physical specifications of 85Kr worst-case accidental release analysis

Table 5.5.2.1-2. Input parameters for 85Kr dispersion modeling

Table 5.5.2.1-3. Maximum potential downwind dose to off-site individuals from the release of 0.25 Ci of 85Kr for various meteorological conditions

Table 5.5.2.2-1. Room specifications and event parameters for the toxic-metal worst-case accidental release scenario

Table 5.5.2.2-2. Meteorological and physical input parameters of the worst-case accidental dispersion analysis

Table 5.5.2.2-3. Estimates of maximum downwind toxic-metal concentration and distance for three wind speeds and all atmospheric stability classes for chemistry laboratories P-2 or K-1 at a release height of 10 m

Table 5.5.2.2-4. Estimates of maximum downwind toxic-metal concentration and distance for three wind speeds and all atmospheric stability classes for a ground-level release from the engineering laboratory, A-1

Table 5.5.2.3-1. Input parameters for worst-case accidental release analysis for fluorine gas

Table 5.5.2.3-2. Maximum downwind concentrations and distances predicted from the release of fluorine gas under worst-case meteorological conditions

Table 5.5.3.4-1. Applicable federal and state regulations governing hazardous waste (FONSI) and Environmental Assessment Nuclear Directed Energy Research Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT
NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY RESEARCH FACILITY
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy
ACTION: Finding of No Significant Impact
SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared an
Environmental Assessment (EA) DOE/EA-03 64, for the construction
and operation of the proposed Nuclear Directed Energy Research
Facility (NDERF) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL), Livermore, California. NDERF will house the X-Ray Laser
Program which is the current Nuclear Directed Energy Weapon
(NDEW) research program at LLNL. NDERF will consist of offices
and laboratories where employees will perform research and
development activities that currently are being conducted at
various locations within the LLNL Livermore site. The operation
of NDERF will consolidate these existing activities and personnel
into one facility.
Based on the analyses in the EA, DOE has determined that the
proposed action does not constitute a major or federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. Therefore, an Environmental Impact
Statement is not required.
PROPOSED ACTION: The proposed action is the construction and
operation of NDERF at LLNL. It will be located adjacent to the
Nuclear Test Technology Complex (NTTC) near the southwest corner
of the Livermore site. Construction and operation of NTTC was
addressed in an Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-0357) which was
issued by DOE in June 1988. NDERF and NTTC will share access
roads, parking, landscaping, exterior lighting, and a central
utility plant. NDERF will consist of a 73,000 square foot office
building and a 121,000 square foot laboratory building for
physics, chemistry, and engineering activities. It will
substantially increase the laboratory space available for
developing new materials and fabrication, assembly, and handling
techniques, and provide the carefully controlled laboratory
environments needed to ensure product quality. It will
consolidate into one facility the X-Ray Laser Program, which is
the current NDEW research program at LLNL. NDERF will result in
improved program management, better communication between
scientific and engineering teams, more efficient security, and
increased flexibility to meet rapidly changing program needs.
ALTERNATIVES: Five alternatives were considered and are assessed
in the EA: no action; performing the NDERF mission in an existing
but modified facility; constructing and operating NDERF at an
alternative site within LLNL; constructing and operating NDERF at
an alternative DOE site, including Site 300 (located about 10
miles east of LLNL); and the preferred alternative (NOERF on the
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southwest site at LLNL).
The no action alternative would require the continued use of
existing facilities that have been expanded to the maximum
extent. This would hinder the nation's NDEW effort and possibly
affect national security by not providing the
environmentally-controlled facilities needed for continued
progress in the X-Ray Laser Program. The environmental
consequences resulting from the no action alternative would not
differ substantially from those resulting from the preferred
alternative (NDERF), with its modern facilities and environmental
controls. The conduct of the X-Ray Laser Program in existing but
modified facilities would involve extensive renovations, which
would be more disruptive to ongoing activities than would
building NDERF, yet would not alleviate overcrowded conditions
that presently exist at present LLNL facilities. The
environmental consequences of this alternative would be similar
to those of the preferred alternative.
The northeast quadrant of LLNL is the only other feasible on-site
area for locating a facility the size of NDERF. The
environmental consequences of performing the NDERF mission at an
alternative site in the northeast quadrant of LLNL would be
similar to the preferred site, except that the prevailing west to
southwest winds would tend to move any emissions to the air in a
predominately off-site direction. This alternative also is less
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desirable because of the much greater distance to the existing
support facilities that are needed by the activities proposed to
be housed in NDERF. Site 300, east of livermore, was considered
as an alternative DOE site for NDERF. The potential
environmental consequences of operating NDERF there would be
lessened somewhat by the relatively lower population density.
Disadvantages would be due to the extended commute of 400
employees from the Livermore area to Site 300, by the remoteness
of the support and program infrastructure at LLNL, and by a need
to provide at Site 300 the utilities and other facilities that
will be shared with NTTC under the preferred alternative.
Existing operations are proposed to be consolidated and housed in
NDERF, thus the environmental consequences associated with
operation, such as resource consumption, potential releases of
hazardous materials to the environment, and the generation of
waste, are similar for all of the alternatives. None of the
alternatives results in a substantial reduction in impacts
compared with the preferred alternative.
FINDINGS: The EA analyzes the impacts of constructing and
operating NDERF, at the preferred site in `the southwest quadrant
of LLNL, on land use, vegetation and wildlife (including rare and
endangered species), cultural and historical resources, parking
and traffic, noise, worker and public health and safety, air
quality, and water and power consumption.
4
Construction Impacts: Construction of NDERF is scheduled to
begin in June 1989. Interior work will continue until late 1992.
Noise and truck traffic will accompany construction.
Construction noise is transitory, but occasionally will disturb
workers in nearby on-site buildings. Construction will be
confined to normal work hours. Noise is not expected to be
significant off-site, since the nearest site boundary is 1000
feet away. Nearly all of the area to be disturbed is part of
LLNL's existing west parking lot, thus no impacts are expected to
cultural and historic resources, vegetation and wildlife, or to
threatened and endangered species.
Operational Impacts: Based on its design capability, NDERF is
expected to increase LLNL's annual water consumption by a maximum
of 2.2% and its electricity consumption by 6.6%. The combined
operations of NDERF and NTTC are expected to increase LLNL' s
annual sewer discharges by about 4% and its natural gas
consumption by 5.4%.
NDERF is considered a low hazard facility and will contain no
Special Nuclear Materials or tritium.
Hazardous wastes, including solvents and heavy metals, will be
generated by NDERF operations. These wastes will be handled,
stored, treated, transported, and disposed of in accordance with
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federal, state, and local regulations. These wastes will be
comparable in type and amount to the existing NDEW waste streams
that they will supplant, thus the net amount of generated wastes
will not increase significantly as a result of NDERF operations.
Operations that may generate fugitive chemical vapors will be
performed in exhaust hoods to protect workers. Emissions will be
HEPA-filtered to minimize the release of toxic particulates to
the atmosphere. Dispersion modeling was performed on chemicals
identified as air toxics, and their potential maximum
concentrations and downwind points of occurrence were determined.
The total probability of a cancer effect from these chemicals for
a maximally exposed individual is calculated to be 2.1 x 1O^-8, or
1 in 50,000,000, which is substantially below the California Air
Resources Board acceptable level of 1 x 10^-6. No significant
impacts to workers, the public, or to the environment are
expected from routine operations.
The potential environmental consequences of accidents are
considered and analyzed in the EA. Conditions specified for
these analyses are consistent with a maximum credible accident
having a probability of less than one in a million (10^-6).
Several accident scenarios that are beyond the credible (or
design basis) also have been developed and evaluated. They
include the release of the radioisotope Krypton 85 (85Kr) from a
sealed source, a toxic metal release, and a fluorine gas release.
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None posed significant risk to workers, the public, or the
environment.
The analysis of a postulated worst-case accident of 85Kr release
demonstrates that the maximum dose to an off-site individual
would be 1.5 x 10^-7 rem compared with the DOE radiation standard
for protection of the public of 0.5 rem per year for exposure due
to an unusual occurrence. The postulated worst-case release of
toxic metals was considered and estimates were made for the
maximum concentration that individuals would be exposed to during
a hypothetical uncontrolled fire at the facility. The maximum
off-site concentration was estimated to be 0.08 mg/m^3, a level at
which exposed individuals would not experience adverse health
effects. NDERF will have a fire suppression system along with
emergency response plans to prevent the possibility of an
uncontrolled fire. A credible fire scenario, therefore, would
result in less toxic material actually being released to the
environment at lower concentrations than estimated in the EA for
worst-case analytical purposes. An analysis was performed to
assess the consequences of an accidental release of fluorine gas
from laser operations, an event considered to be highly unlikely.
Atmospheric dispersion analyses of a postulated worst-case
accidental release determined that the maximum downwind
concentration of fluorine gas would be 0.201 ppm, which is below
the level at which exposed individuals would experience health
effects.
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These accident scenarios all are considered to have very low
probabilities of occurrence, and their resulting health effects
would be inconsequential (if an unlikely release were to occur).
Single copies of the EA (DOE/EA-0364) are available from:
William R. Holman
U.S. Department of Energy
1333 Broadway
Oakland, CA 94612
Phone: (415) 273-6370
For further information regarding the NEPA process, contact:
Carol M. Borgstrom, Director
Office of NEPA Project Assistance
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20585
Phone: (202) 586-4600
Issued this __________ day of August, 1989.
Peter M. Brush,
Acting Assistant Secretary
Environment, Safety and Health
8
DOE/EA-0364

Environmental Assessment
Nuclear Directed Energy Research Facility
at
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory

June 1989

PREFACE

This environmental assessment (EA) for the Nuclear Directed Energy Research
Facility was prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
of 1969, as amended, 42 USC, section 4321 et seq. This EA follows the applicable policies and
procedures for Department of Energy compliance with NEPA set forth in the Federal
Register 47662 (December 15,1987).

1. INTRODUCTION

This environmental assessment (EA) considers the proposed construction and
operation of the Nuclear Directed Energy Research Facility (NDERF) in the southwest
corner of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Livermore site (see
Fig. 1-1). A classified appendix has been prepared for this document that expands the dis-
cussions on chemical operations and hazardous-waste generation. NDERF would be
located adjacent to the Nuclear Test Technology Complex (NTTC), with which it would
share access roads, parking, landscaping, exterior lighting, and a central utility plant.
The location of the two facilities, their shared parking and central plant, and NTTC
operations have been treated in a separate environmental assessment (US DOE, 1988a).
NDERF would consist of offices and laboratories where employees would perform
research and development activities that currently are being conducted at the various
locations within the LLNL Livermore site. The operation of NDERF would consolidate
these existing activities and personnel into one facility. NDERF would serve a twofold
purpose: first, it would partially fulfill the need to modernize LLNL's engineering,
materials, physics and chemistry laboratory facilities and, second, would consolidate the
X-Ray Laser Program, which is the current nuclear directed energy weapon (NDEW)
research program in the LLNL Defense Systems Department. NDERF operations do not
require tritium or Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) (plutonium, enriched uranium), so
these materials would not be in NDERF at any time. In the future, if changing activities
pose increased risk to either LLNL workers or the general public, a subsequent National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review would be required.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED PROJECT AND ALTERNATIVES
2.1 PURPOSE AND NEED

NDERF would support the X-Ray Laser Program, whose goals necessitate the
accelerated development of several technologies. The Program would need to develop new
materials; define new fabrication, assembly, and handling techniques; carefully control
laboratory environments; and assure product quality. The new facility would substan-
tially increase the amount of laboratory space available for material development,
characterization, fabrication, and assembly. More importantly, NDERF would provide
Laboratory environmental controls necessary to achieve the engineering precision these
efforts require. Advanced features incorporated into the NDERF design would be
vibration isolation, rigid temperature and humidity controls, cleanliness, and high-
efficiency particulate-filtered local exhaust to ensure the safe handling of toxic materials.
Figure (Page 2)
Figure 1-1. Area map showing the location of the proposed Nuclear Directed Energy
Research Facility (NDERF) and Nuclear Test Technology Complex (NTTC) at the
Livermore site.
NDERF would consolidate the personnel and equipment required to meet the
specific X-Ray Laser Program goal of demonstrating x-ray laser technology. The new
facility would allow for more effective program management, better communication
between scientists and engineering teams, more efficient security, and increased
flexibility to meet rapidly changing Program needs.

2.2 PROJECT LOCATION

The Livermore site is located on 332 ha (819 acres) approximately 80 km (50 miles)
east of San Francisco in one of the most rapidly growing parts of the Bay Area (see
Fig.2.2-1). Agriculture remains the major land use east of the Livermore site, but land to
the north is being developed for light and heavy industrial use. To the west, agricultural
land has been zoned residential, and land sales, subdivisions, and annexations by the
City of Livermore are increasingly common (University of California, 1986). On its
southern perimeter, the Livermore site shares East Avenue with Sandia National
Laboratories, Livermore (SNLL).
It is proposed that NDERF be located on a portion of an existing paved parking area
in the southwest quadrant of the Livermore site, on a small portion of the land acquired
under Project 83-D-199, Buffer Land Acquisition (US DOE, 1984), which is contiguous to the
previous southwest boundary of the Livermore site (see Fig. 2.2-2). Locating NDERF and
NTTC on a small portion of the newly acquired land is discussed in more detail in the
NTTC environmental assessment. (US DOE, 1988a).
This location is consistent with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site
Development and Facility Plan (LLNL 1987b), which defines a security buffer zone
extending approximately 500 ft east of Vasco Road, with the remaining newly-acquired
land to the historic site boundary available for alternate use on a case-by-case basis. The
historic site boundary was at 1100 ft from Vasco Road. NDERF is 1030 ft from Vasco Road,
as a small part of the laboratory (70 ft) extends into the newly-acquired land.
3
Figure (Page 4)
Figure 2.2-1. Location of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Figure (Page 5)
Figure 2.2-2. Area map showing the location of the proposed Nuclear Directed Energy
Research Facility (NDERF) within the NDERF/NTTC Planning Area at the Livermore Site.

2.3 PROPOSED DESIGN

NDERF would combine approximately 11241 m^2 (121000 ft^2) of laboratory space
and approximately 6782 m^2 (73000 ft^2) of office space. The laboratory and office buildings
would be constructed of fire-resistant materials, and automatic fire-protection systems
will be installed. The design and construction of NDERF is in compliance with all
appropriate codes and regulations (see Appendix A). The seismic design of NDERF will
incorporate the findings of a recent assessment of potential earthquake hazards
(Scheimer, 1985) and adhere to applicable seismic standards and specifications as
provided for seismic Zone 4 by the Uniform Building Code (International Conference and
Building Official, 1988; LLNL, 1987a).
The laboratory space would consist of specialized state-of-the-art chemistry,
materials science, physics, and engineering laboratories; machine shops; and high-bay
facilities. Some laboratory personnel also would be provided offices in the laboratory
space. The laboratory structure would be a two-story building, framed with structural steel
and enclosed by concrete panels. Physics laboratories are proposed for the first floor, with
chemistry and materials laboratories proposed for the second floor Engineering
laboratories are proposed for both floors. The engineering laboratories would consist of
machine shops, general-purpose light-activity laboratories, and a general-purpose high-
bay area. A second high-bay area is proposed with clean-room characteristics requiring
rigid temperature and humidity controls. Utility rooms, assembly areas, storage areas,
and shipping and receiving areas also would be included.
For ventilation purposes, NDERF would have three types of work areas. The first
type of work area, consisting of offices and those areas where no toxic or hazardous
materials operations would be performed, would be ventilated by a standard heating
ventilation/air-conditioning (HVAC) system. The second type of work area, consisting of
areas where toxic or hazardous materials operations are proposed, would be ventilated
separately and would include exhaust hoods and, where appropriate, high-efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) filters. Each HEPA filter serving a regular fume hood would be
housed in stainless steel. The third type of work area comprises the laboratories requiring
both precise environmental controls and toxic material containment, which would be
accomplished by cabinet enclosures and HEPA filtration of the cabinet exhaust air. The
HEPA filters serving this area would be located in the mechanical room. These filters
would be in a special large stainless steel housing with three independent sections
6
allowing one section to be maintained while the other two continue to run. Both HEPA
systems would have 99.97% filtration efficiency with pre-filters. Building exhausts, except
for perchloric acid fumes and possible fluorine gas emissions, would be vented to the
atmosphere through a 25-m (82-ft) stack to minimize the exposure of LLNL personnel and
the public to fugitive gaseous emissions and to toxic emissions that may result from an
accidental release. Operations using perchloric acid would be performed in an exhaust
hood and stack system specially designed for those operations following standard
chemical industry practice. The perchloric acid hood would be used for chemical analysis
and the amount of perchloric acid in use at any one time will not exceed 100 ml. In
addition, one liter of perchloric acid would be stored in the hood. In the event of a fire
involving engineering laboratories where toxic metals would be used, the involved area
would be isolated and smoke would be exhaused from the facility via a separate smoke-
exhaust system, which utilizes the facility stack and bypasses the HEPA filtration system.
Design features intended to mitigate potential impacts to the environment are discussed in
Section 5.
In general, in those laboratories where liquid chemical operations are to be
performed, sinks would drain into an above-ground retention tank system. When a
retention tank becomes full, a representative sample of rinse water in the tank is analyzed
for acceptability for release to the sewer system. All sewage effluent would pass through a
flow-measuring flume at the sewer outfall located in the northwest corner of LLNL. A
continuous monitoring system alerts responding personnel if levels are exceeded for
selected metals, radiation, and pH. Samples also are collected daily to measure gross
alpha and gross beta activity and are composited monthly to determine concentrations of
tritium, Cs-137, Pu-239, and various metals. Also, once each quarter, one of the daily
composite samples is analyzed for parameters specified in the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Four analytical laboratories would
have drains to the sanitary sewer to accommodate the small amount of noncontaminated
water output of distillation columns. Floor drains would be plumbed to the sanitary sewer
but would be capped to prevent spills from entering the sanitary sewer. If a spill occurs, a
determination would be made if the spilled material could be released to the sanitary
sewer. If this spilled material could not be released to the sanitary sewer, it would be
vacuumed up and sent to LLNL Hazardous Waste Management for proper disposal.
The office building adjacent to the laboratories would be a high-density two-story
structure of standard construction, housing approximately 320 people. The building would
7
be attached to the laboratory by second-story bridges, which also would contain office space.
The office building would house the Program office and the Program's professional and
technical staff. It also would provide conference areas, a library, a briefing room, a
drafting area, vaults, computer space, and storage areas.
Land improvements in the NDERF/NTTC project area, as previously discussed in
the EA for NTTC (US DOE, 1988a), would include site clearing, grading for site drainage,
roads, parking, landscaping, lighting, and fencing. Utility extensions required to serve
the complex include water, gas, power, communications, and sanitary sewer. Utilities
would be extended from mains located east of the proposed site.

2.4 RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROPOSED PROJECT TO OTHER ACTIVITIES AT LLNL

NDERF would be located adjacent to NTTC. However, because construction and
operation of NTTC are not part of the NDERF project, they are not discussed in this EA.
The EA prepared for the NTTC project (US DOE, 1988a) assesses the impacts of NDERF's
and NTTC's shared facilities--namely, access roads, parking, landscaping, exterior
lighting, and a central utility plant.
Currently, parking is a particularly acute problem in the southwest quadrant of
LLNL, especially during winter months when fewer people walk or ride bicycles or
motorcycles to work. While the NDERF and NTTC parking lot area would provide
parking for 1,125 vehicles, there would be no net increase in personnel at LLNL resulting
from these projects. Eight-hundred (800) spaces would replace existing parking
demolished by construction of the buildings and 325 spaces would serve the net influx of
personnel into the southwest quadrant of LLNL. Most vehicles currently enter the facility
on the west side, so traffic flow is not projected to change significantly.
The five-year site-development plan for LLNL (LLNL, 1987b) includes enhance-
ment of site security, improvement in traffic circulation, and development of an
integrated complex for the Defense Systems Program. The NDERF project design
incorporates these needs and addresses these site-development plan issues. In addition,
the NTTC/NDERF buildings, the roads, and the parking areas would not interfere with the
LLNL Groundwater Restoration Project. For more information, see the NTTC environ-
mental assessment (US DOE, 1988a).
8
The present level of research and development of the X-Ray Laser Program, which
would be the first program to use NDERF, has been achieved by using existing facilities at
the Livermore site. NDERF would consolidate research and development activities into
one facility, allowing presently used space to be vacated to partially relieve the crowding
that exists in the southwest quadrant of LLNL. These vacated laboratories could be
returned to other programmatic uses, giving existing research and development efforts
more space for their operations. It is anticipated that this return to other uses will not
involve extensive cleanup (decontamination). Standard operational procedures for
existing facilities include workplace environment monitoring. This monitoring
procedure, taken together with immediate cleanup of any locally contaminated areas, will
result in minimal cleanup before transfer of existing facilities to other programmatic
uses.
Also, a major part of the crowding in the southwest quadrant results from the use of
trailers to house employees in the quadrant. The use of trailers decreases the amount of
land available for open space, parking, and modern laboratory and office space. NDERF
would enable a more efficient use of space and would be a step toward LLNL's long-term
planning goal to eliminate the use of trailers (LLNL, 1987b).

2.5 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED PROJECT

The following alternatives for the proposed project were considered:
1) Taking no action
2) Performing the NDERF mission in an existing but modified facility
3) Constructing NDERF at an alternative LLNL Livermore site
4) Constructing NDERF at an alternative DOE site
5) Constructing and operating the preferred alternative
Three major objectives led to the selection of the preferred alternative: location of
the new weapons research facilities proximate to existing facilities in the southwest
quadrant so personnel with routine interactions can work close to each other; location of
the new facilities and their required service yard areas on adequately sized parcels of
land; and location of the new facilities to minimize environmental impacts.
9

2.5.1 No Action

Operations that would be consolidated in NDERF currently are performed at LLNL
and would continue to be performed there if the no-action alternative is selected. The
X-Ray Laser Program and other LLNL programs, in performing their mission, require
additional space and a facility designed for the development of new technologies needed in
the next several decades. A no-action alternative is not reasonable because it would hinder
the nation's NDEW effort and possibly affect national security. It neither would reduce
overcrowding in the southwest quadrant nor facilitate communication among personnel
who support the same programmatic objectives.

2.5.2. Perform the NDERF Mission in an Existing but Modified Facility

The feasibility of upgrading an existing facility so that it is compatible with
Program requirements was considered. Research and development activities for the
X-Ray Laser Program require specialized environments having rigid cleanliness,
temperature, and humidity controls. Existing facilities would require extensive
modification to allow for the diverse activities and exacting environmental control
proposed for NDERF. These modifications would be more disruptive to ongoing operations
than would constructing a new facility, and the adverse impact on various program
elements during modification would be unacceptable. Such a modification would not
resolve the overcrowded conditions in existing facilities in the southwest corner of the site.
Since the operations proposed for NDERF presently are performed at LLNL, environ-
mental impacts associated with resource consumption, potential releases of hazardous
materials to the environment, or generation of waste would be similar to those effects
discussed in Section 5.

2.5.3. Construct NDERF at an Alternative LLNL Livermore Site

In reviewing the possible alternatives to the preferred project, alternate sites for
construction of NDERF within the boundaries of LLNL were considered. Because of the
amount of existing development at LLNL, there are limited sites of a sufficient size to
support the proposed project. Demolition of existing facilties to create a vacant parcel of a
size sufficient to accommodate the NDERF project was not considered feasible given the
excessive cost in demolition and resultant relocation of ongoing programs. For these
10
reasons, the site located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL was considered the only viable
undeveloped alternative site at LLNL.
Potential environmental impacts associated with development at the preferred
location are applicable to this alternative siting. The alternative site is in the northeast
corner of LLNL and would be approximately the same distance from the northeast fence
line as the preferred alternative would be from the southwest fence line. Any off-site
impacts, therefore, would be equivalent. The analysis provided for the preferred
alternative would apply in most cases to this alternative.
Although the majority of impacts associated with the preferred alternative and this
site would be similar, choice of this alternative would add additional potential impacts on
the environment. These impacts would result from the distance between the alternative
site and existing support facilities required for the types of activities proposed for the
NDERF project. These support facilities, mainly computer systems, are located in the
southwest corner of LLNL. Providing the necessary secure, hard line cable connections
would disrupt LLNL activities and increase the cost of the project considerably. Because
some key personnel associated with work to be performed at NDERF would have to remain
in the southwest quadrant of LLNL, placement of NDERF at this alternative site also would
complicate routine key personnel interactions and increase vehicular trips at LLNL. The
preferred location is convenient to other x-ray laser facilities and personnel.

2.5.4 Construct NDERF at an Alternative DOE Site

Sites were also considered at other DOE facilities, including Site 300. Because the
proposed project represents a consolidation of activities existing at the Livermore site, any
alternative location would require relocation of personnel and support infrastructures
associated with on-going research projects. Also, NDERF has been designed so that some
facilities, including a security fence, perimeter lighting, and a road, will be shared with
another new building in this location, the Nuclear Test Technology Complex (NTTC).
11

2.5.5 Construct and Operate the Preferred Alternative

The discussion of the preferred alternative, the proposed construction and operation
of NDERF in the southwest quadrant of the Livermore site (Fig. 1.1), is the substance of this
document. A description of the design of NDERF is presented in Section 2.3. Proposed
operations are discussed in Section 4 and potential effects are discussed in Section 5.
Since the preferred alternative would be a consolidation and modernization of
existing x-ray laser operations at LLNL, the impacts associated with this alternative would
be similar to those posed by the no-action alternative, but would be less than those associated
with the alternatives posed by placement at an alternative site or modification of existing
facilities.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING ENVIRONMENT

A brief description of the environment surrounding LLNL is presented in this
section. A more detailed description can be found in the Environmental Impact Report
(University of California, 1986) and the Environmental Impact Statement (US DOE, 1982)
for LLNL.

3.1 GEOGRAPHY AND GEOLOGY

LLNL is located about 80 km (50 miles) east of San Francisco in the Livermore
Valley in southern Alameda County. The Livermore Valley is situated in a section of the
California Coast Range that lies between the San Francisco Bay on the west and the
northern San Joaquin Valley to the east. The Livermore site occupies an area of
approximately 3.3 km^2 (1.3 mile^2) and overlies a land surface of low relief that slopes
gently downward to the northwest. Two groups of low hills are situated approximately
1 km (0.6 miles) southeast and 3.2 km (2 miles) northwest of the site. Elevations at the site
range from a high of 206 m (675 ft) at the southeast corner of the site to 174 m (570 ft) at the
northwest corner. A number of geologic faults pass either through or nearby the site,
including the Greenville, Tesla, and Las Positas faults. More distant but more active
faults that can affect the site include the San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras faults
(Carpenter et al., 1984).
12

3.2 SEISMICITY

The Livermore site of LLNL is located in a region that has experienced
earthquakes within historical times. Active faults considered capable of causing strong
ground motion at the Livermore site have been identified and the potential impact on LLNL
operations assessed. A detailed presentation of the subject can be found in the Draft
Environmental Impact Report on LLNL operations (University of California, 1986).

3.3 CLIMATE AND AIR QUALITY

The climate of the Livermore Valley is characterized by mild, rainy winters and
warm, dry summers. The mean annual temperature is 12.5* C (59* F); the normal season-
al temperature range is defined by nighttime winter lows in the vicinity of 0* C (32* F) and
summer daytime highs around 38* C (100* F).
Prevailing winds are from the west and southwest from April through September; during
the remainder of the year wind directions are variable. Both rainfall and wind exhibit a
strong seasonal pattern. Most of the precipitation occurs between October and April, with
very little rainfall during the warmer months of the year. The highest and lowest annual
rainfalls on record are 782 mm (30.8 in.) and 138 mm (5.4 in.).
Measurements by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) have
determined that the Livermore Valley region has met all ambient air quality standards
except those for ozone (BAAQMD, 1987).

3.4 WATER USE

Major drainages in the Livermore Valley are the Arroyo Valle, Arroyo Las
Positas, Arroyo Mocho, Arroyo Seco, Cottonwood Creek, and Tassajara Creek. These
streams all are intermittent and flow generally to the west, with the exception of
Cottonwood Creek and Tassajara Creek, which flow south. Only Arroyo Las Positas and
Arroyo Seco cross the Livermore site. The Arroyo Seco crosses the southwest corner of the
Livermore site near the NDERF/NTTC planning area and receives a minor amount of
Livermore site runoff. The major portion of the new parking lot areas would be drained to
the Arroyo Seco. The remaining drainage would be diverted on-site to an existing channel
or to the existing Vasco Road channel. Both of these channels drain northward to Arroyo
13
Los Positas. Drainage to the existing Vasco Road channel from the proposed site is
calculated to be equivalent to the drainage now flowing to the Vasco Road channel. Arroyo
Las Positas flows westward along the northern edge of LLNL. The Arroyo Seco and Arroyo
Los Positas merge in the west end of the valley to form the southward-flowing Arroyo de la
Laguna, a tributary to the Alameda Creek drainage system. Winter flows that have not
been captured as groundwater recharge flow out of the southwestern corner of the valley,
eventually entering San Francisco Bay by way of Alameda Creek. Surface water bodies
near the site include the South Bay Aqueduct, the treatment tanks and reservoir of the
Patterson Pass water treatment facility, Frick Lake, Lake Del Valle, Lake Isabel, and the
lake at Shadow Cliffs Regional Park. LLNL normally receives its treated water supply
from the Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct, which also supplies San Francisco.
Storm water on the Livermore site is channeled through storm sewers designed to
accommodate a ten-year storm event. Open ditches are used in undeveloped areas of the
site. The main outlet for the site's surface drainage is at the northwest corner of the site.
Sewage from LLNL is discharged into the City of Livermore's sanitary sewer
system and processed at the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant (LWRP). As part of the
Livermore-Amador Valley Waste Water Management Program, treated sanitary waste
water is transported out of the valley through a pipeline and discharged into the San
Francisco Bay. It also may be used for summer irrigation of nearby Livermore City
property.

3.5 VEGETATION AND WILDLIFE

Prior to construction at the current LLNL Livermore site, vegetation consisted of
native California grasses that extended to the nearby hills. The few trees that were present
were concentrated along riparian habitats. Annual wild oat was introduced along with
nongrass annuals and perennials that dominated the grassland. The land acquired
under Project 83-D-199, including a portion of the NDERF site, has the same character-
istics as the Livermore site--that is, it was extensively farmed and used for grazing
livestock.
Vegetation on the proposed site today is made up of common landscape plants and
weedy species. Jackrabbits are the most common wild mammal present; gophers, snakes,
and field mice can be found in undeveloped areas. The site hosts numerous birds, reptiles,
14
and amphibians. No threatened or endangered species of plant or animal, or designated
critical habitat, has been found on the Livermore site (Leitner and Leitner, 1986; Bing,
1986; University of California, 1986).

3.6 CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL RESOURCES

Archaeological and cultural resource surveys have been performed on the
Livermore site, including the parcel of land (Alameda County Assessors No. 99A-1475-3-1)
on which NDERF would be sited. These surveys were carried out in accordance with
NEPA requirements (40 CFR part 1500) and Sec. 106 of the National Historic Preservation
Act (16 USC 470).
The first comprehensive survey was performed by Archaeological Consulting and
Research Services of Mill Valley, California. A report of their findings is included in the
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
and Sandia National Laboratories--Livermore Sites (US DOE, 1982). This report covers
the major portion of the NDERF/NTCC planning area, which lies within the Site
boundaries that existed at the time of the report. No significant findings were recorded at
that time.
On March 8, 1982, Basin Research Associates, Inc. of Hayward, Calif. conducted a
field survey of a 35-acre land parcel that includes the remainder of the NDERF/NTCC
planning area. Careful examination of the land surface revealed no significant cultural
artifacts (US DOE, 1988a).

3.7 POPULATION AND LAND USE

When LLNL was founded, Livermore's population was approximately 7000 and the
city limits were three miles west of LLNL's Livermore site. Livermore's population now
is more than 56000, and the city limits reach the site at the western and northern
perimeters. Nonetheless, except for urban growth in the Dublin-Pleasanton-Livermore
area, most of eastern Alameda County is rural and is dominated by agriculture and open
space.
A residential subdivision is located about 244 m (800 ft) west of LLNL's Livermore
site western boundary. A vacant, unincorporated parcel formerly used for dry land
15
farming and rose production exists between the subdivision and South Vasco Road.
Recently this property has been annexed by the City of Livermore and rezoned to allow for
low-density (3 units per acre), single-family residential development (Horst, 1988).
Property south of the site includes agricultural areas, low-density residential
areas, and SNLL, which also is surrounded by Department of Energy (DOE)-owned land.
Grazing is the primary activity, although orchards and vineyards may be found west of
Vasco Road and south of East Avenue. Property south of Tesla Road is primarily open
space or rural ranchettes, with some agricultural use.
Land-use zoning in the area surrounding the site is illustrated in Fig. 3.7-1.
Property to the east of the site is agricultural land with low-density residential develop-
ment. Further east, foothills of the intercoastal range define the eastern margin of the
Livermore Valley. A 287-acre parcel of open space and agricultural land northeast of the
site has recently been rezoned to allow development of a center for heavy industry (see
area 1, Fig. 3.7-1).
During the last 30 years, the City of Livermore has grown to the point where
residential, industrial, and commercial development are occurring on parcels adjacent to
the Livermore site. To preserve site security, DOE acquired additional land around the
Livermore site to serve as a buffer zone (US DOE, 1984). The NDERF/NTTC complex is
proposed to be located on a small part (2.8 of 172 ha; 7 of 424 acres) of this newly acquired
land. Use of this land for NTTC facility, expanded parking, and West Perimeter Drive is
discussed in the NTTC environmental assessment (US DOE, 1988a).

4. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED OPERATIONS

NDERF is designed as a research and development facility that would consolidate
many diverse operations presently performed in various buildings on the Livermore site.
The design provides more space for these operations and provides the flexibility to alter
individual laboratory operations to meet LLNL's future programmatic needs. General
types of operations proposed are engineering, chemical, and experimental physics.
Engineering and chemical operations would require analysis and quality-assurance
capabilities. Chemical operations would develop and produce materials that would be
fabricated into parts through engineering operations. The parts then would be used in
16
Figure (Page 17)
Zoning in the vicinity of LLNL.
experimentation to further develop NDEW technologies. Experimental physics operations
would focus on visible-light laser physics.

4.1 CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

Chemical operations would be performed in laboratories approximately 56 m^2
(600 ft2) each. The laboratories are designed for small-scale chemical processing.
Generally, they would be equipped with bench and cabinet space, utilities, exhaust hoods,
and equipment for various syntheses, process chemistry, formulations, and analytical
operations. Each laboratory would be designed specifically and equipped to perform its
operations efficiently and safely. Those laboratories expected to house operations with
potentially hazardous or toxic materials would be equipped with appropriate safety devices.
These devices and the implementation of operational safety procedures (OSPs)^1 would
minimize the probability of worker exposure and releases to the environment. Operations
with a potential for affecting the environment are discussed in Section 5.
Research and development activities would involve laboratory-scale chemical
processing of liquids and solids. Chemicals used in NDERF operations would vary,
depending on experimental requirements. Because of general utility, standard organic
solvents would be the chemicals most used. (Table 4.1-1 presents a list of chemicals to be
commonly used in NDERF, along with use amounts and annual use totals). Metals in
various chemical forms, organic compounds, acids, silicon compounds, and cyanides
would be used in quantities of approximately a kilogram or less during any operation. A
few of the metals would be naturally occurring radioactive metals. The radiospecific
activities of these types of radioactive metals would be very low; consequently, these metals
represent inconsequential radiotoxic elements. Control, safe use, and containment of
chemicals are discussed in Section 5.
1 LLNL has a health and safety review process for all proposed and ongoing
operations (LLNL, 1987c). For those operations where it has been determined that an
operation could affect the health or safety of LLNL personnel or impact the LLNL or public
environment, an operational safety procedure (OSP) is prepared to assure that the facility
safety design features and the established safety procedures are implemented. The OSP
identifies all hazards and requires the use of adequate controls to ensure that the operation
is performed free of unacceptable risk.
18

Table 4.1-1 Standard organic solvents to be used routinely in NDERF operations.

Chemical Name Amount * Annual Use
L D GAl
Acetone 223 59 984 260
Cyclohexane 45 12 265 70
Ethanol 288 76 341 90
Isopropanol 227 60 2271 600
Methanol 151 40 946 250
Tetramethoxysilane 45 12 379 100
1,1, 1-trichloroethane 19 5 379 100
*Volumes represent the amounts typically present in NDERF during chemical
operations.
Before a new material formulation developed by chemical operations personnel
would be transferred to mechanical engineering operations, the formulated material
would be reviewed and, as appropriate, analyzed for the potential to release toxic materials
as a gas during the engineering operations. Formulations that would generate quantities
of toxic gases that would create a health hazard are not acceptable and would not be
transferred to the engineering operations; instead, they would be disposed as hazardous
waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
A more detailed discussion of chemical operations is contained in Appendix B,
which is classified. It does not significantly differ from the information presented here
and supports the findings of the assessment.

4.2 ENGINEERING OPERATIONS

Engineering operations would include fabrication, characterization, inventory
control, and assembly of parts. These operations would be performed on solid materials
that have been synthesized, formulated, and fabricated by chemical operations at LLNL
and other sites. Three types of engineering laboratories are planned.
. One type would contain machining, assembly, and/or characterization
equipment with associated bench and desk space.
19
The second type would be high-bay laboratory space equipped with a bridge
crane and other equipment needed to manipulate large experimental
assemblies.
The third type would store parts (inventory control) and assemblies
(assembly storage).
The machining tools used to shape the parts would be of two types: conventional
motor-driven tools and laser-cutting tools. Up to six krypton-fluorine laser-cutting tools
may be in use in the machining laboratories. When necessary, engineering operations
would be performed in enclosed cabinets that would be exhausted through HEPA filters.
Engineering operations would characterize and select materials for further
processing. Selected materials would be machined into finished parts, further analyzed
for conformance to specifications, selected for assembly, and assembled in laser
components. HEPA filtration would be provided to prevent worker exposure and
atmospheric release of toxic particulates generated by machining operations.
Characterization operations would employ the use of four radioisotopes that are
bound or contained in metal containers as sealed sources. Table 4.2-1 gives the number of
each radioisotope, its activity (in Curies), and physical description of each of the four types
of sources. Operations involving these sources of ionizing radiation have been reviewed
by the LLNL Hazards Control Safety Team, and OPSs have been developed to protect the
worker and prevent release of the material to the environment. Because of implement-
ation of OPSs and because of the physical form of the radioactive sources, it is highly
unlikely that these materials would be released to the environment. The potential impact
from these encapsulated sources is presented in Section 5.5.1.1. X-ray generators that they
are electrically powered and do not contain radioactive material also would be used.
Metal parts prepared through standard machine-shop operations would be cleaned
in a parts-cleaning operation using 1,1,1-trichloroethane. It is estimated that the parts-
cleaning station would contain a small amount of solvent, approximately 19 L (5 gal).
20

Table 4.2-1 Radioactive sources used in calibration operations.

Activity Disposition
(mCi) Number of Isotope Encapsulation
55Fe 10 6 Electrodeposit None
on copper disk
109Cd 10 6 Bound to ion- Stainless steel
exchange resin with alumi-
num window
241Am 45 6 Ceramic bead Stainless steel
85Kr 250 6 Gas @ 3 atm Titanium with
0.001-in.-thick
window

4.3 CHEMICAL AND HAZARDOUS WASTE STORAGE

Chemical storage within the laboratories would be limited to amounts required for
operations; it also would be limited by National Fire Prevention Association fire codes and
DOE Health and Safety requirements. Reserves will be segregated by compatibility class
and stored adjacent to the NDERF laboratory building in small metal buildings (sheds)
specifically designed to store hazardous materials (LLNL, 1987c, Sections 8 and 21).
Hazardous, low-level radioactive, and mixed waste generated from operations in
the facility, will be accumulated and handled in accordance with guidelines established
for waste accumulation areas (Sledge and Hirabayashi, 1987). Basically, wastes will be
placed in appropriate containers, which will be labeled to identify wastes contained.
Containers in less than 55-gallon quantities may be stored in the individual laboratories
while they are filling. When full, or as generated, containers would be placed in the
designated Waste Accumulation Area (WAA) for temporary storage for periods less than
90 days. The WAA would consist of a portable steel storage shed that provides secondary
containment, segregation of incompatible wastes, and fire protection. Spill kits for
cleanup of minor spills, and personal protective equipment would be provided. The WAA
would be inspected weekly. Hazardous Waste Management personnel would transport the
21
waste to the on-site permitted hazardous waste facility (B-612 Yard) where it would be
processed for disposal at an appropriate landfill.
Unclassified waste would be accumulated in an adjacent out-structure designed to
house hazardous wastes, while classified hazardous waste would be accumulated inside the
laboratory building. Unclassified waste consists primarily of paper and plastic products
contaminated from salt and foam operations and would be accumulated up to 1. 13m3
(39.91 ft3) in the waste storage shed. Also included would be approximately 125 gallons of
unclassified liquid including methanol, isopropyl alcohol, freon, and acetone.

4.4 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS/RESPONSE PLAN

LLNL has established the Emergency Preparedness Plan (LLNL, 1988b), which
sets forth the crisis management structure, the response procedures, and personnel roles
for all major emergencies and disasters occurring on LLNL properties or occurring off-
site with the potential for impact on LLNL. These potential emergencies include, but are
not limited to the following: earthquake, release of toxic materials, radiation incident,
major fire, explosion, natural disaster, civil disturbance, terrorism, and bomb threat.
It is the responsibility of all LLNL organizations to ensure that emergency plans
and procedures are developed and that they are consistent with credible emergencies that
could occur at their facilities. DOE prescribes the general requirements for emergency
plans and procedures, such as the LLNL Emergency Preparedness Plan, while Sections 2
and 3 of LLNL's Health and Safety Manual, (LLNL, 1987c) describe how these require-
ments would be implemented in the NDERF facility safety procedures and self-help plans.
The LLNL Health and Safety Manual specifies that the Emergency Preparedness
Plan shall be reviewed annually by the Emergency Preparedness and Response Program
(EP&RP) to establish that its contents are appropriate and adequate for current operations.
The EP&RP Leader has oversight responsibility to ensure that various emergency
response organizations perform the functions described in this plan. Moreover, the
EP&RP Leader ensures that the Health, Environment, Safety, and Quality Assurance
(HESQA) Committee audits the plan at least biennially.
In the event of a major emergency or disaster occurring on LLNL property, or an
off-site incident that could affect LLNL facilities, the Emergency Response Plan would be
22
activated to initiate appropriate action to protect life and property at LLNL and vicinity and
to restore operational integrity as soon as possible.
The emergency response organizations expand upon established emergency
services that deal with routine problems. Emergency response organizations include Fire,
Health Services, Security, Plant Engineering, Safety, Environmental, and Public Affairs
teams. EP&RP is concerned with major emergencies or disasters that involve more than
one element of the emergency response organization or are of significant concern to the
public.
Emergency preparedness and response plans would be established for NDERF as
part of the overall Livermore site-wide planning process. In the event of a major
earthquake or fire, operations will be shut down in an orderly fashion and the facility
would be evacuated. Damage then would be assessed and those areas determined safe for
operation would be allowed to operate. If a fire occurs involving engineering laboratories
where toxic metals would be used, the involved area would be isolated and the smoke would
be exhausted from the facility via a separate smoke-exhaust system, which utilizes the
facility stack and bypasses the HEPA filtration system (described in Section 2.3). The
LLNL Fire Department is the responsible fire department for the LLNL Livermore site and
the surrounding area. This responsibility has been formalized in an Automatic Aid
Agreement (see Sharry, 1988) between the City of Livermore, the Regents of the University
of California, and DOE. If an emergency involving NDERF were to occur, the LLNL Fire
Department Incident Commander would take appropriate action to block traffic and
remove LLNL personnel and the public from the area to minimize the risk of personal
injury to these people (Sharry, 1988). In the event that smoke or fire from an emergency
threatens LLNL facilities or nearby residential areas, the LLNL Fire Department would
order and direct evacuation of the threatened areas.

5. EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES ON THE ENVIRONMENT

For this discussion of effects, the alternatives discussed in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3
are considered to have effects similar to the preferred alternative and will not be discussed
separately.
23

5.1 EFFECTS OF THE NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE

The X-Ray Laser Program currently performs its mission in existing facilities at
LLNL's Livermore site. Existing facilities have been expanded to the maximum extent
practical but continue to be inadequate due to insufficient space for projected operations,
inadequate environmental control that hampers precision engineering operations and
puts parts and materials at risk during movement between activities, and the inability to
maintain the requisite cleanliness and restricted access in existing Laboratory spaces.
The operations described in Section 2 would continue to be performed and their effects
would be similar to effects discussed in Section 5.3. LLNL would continue to implement
standardized facility and operations safety-analysis procedures (US DOE, 1988c; LLNL,
1987c) and environmental protection procedures (US DOE, 1987) on existing operations that
also would be applied to NDERF operations. Thus, apart from temporary construction
effects, environmental effects resulting from selection of the no-action alternative would
not differ substantially from those resulting from selection of the preferred alternative.

5.2 EFFECTS OF PERFORMING THE NDERF MISSION IN AN EXISTING BUT MODIFIED FACILITY

The effects of performing the NDERF mission in an existing but modified facility
would be similar to the effects posed by the preferred alternative. The estimated
consequences from worst-case accident analyses would be the same.
In assessing such consequences, no design features or operational procedures
unique to the preferred alternative were considered. One of the adverse impacts on various
program elements during the modification would be the reduction of efficiency of research
and development activities. This would lead to an increase in the time to perform the
various research and development tasks and require an increase in power, natural gas,
and water consumption.

5.3 EFFECTS OF CONSTRUCTING NDERF AT AN ALTERNATIVE LLNL LIVERMORE SITE

The effects of performing the NDERF mission at an alternative LLNL Livermore
site in the northeast quadrant would be similar to the effects posed by the preferred
alternative. The alternate site is approximately the same distance to the fence line between
24
LLNL and the public areas, but the prevailing wind pattern places the accidental toxic
release plume normally in an off-site direction, whereas the preferred location places the
wind direction normally on-site. This alternate site also would place NDERF within
approximately 600 ft of the Human Resources (Personnel), Procurement, and University of
California Davis facilities, which routinely involve the outside public in their daily
activities.

5.4 EFFECTS OF CONSTRUCTING AND OPERATING NDERF AT AN ALTERNATIVE DOE SITE

Site 300 was considered as an alternative DOE site. The effects from an accidental
toxic release would likely be less, but this is dependent upon the specific location. A
location near the general services area would be preferred to avoid the operational
difficulties that would routinely occur when the remainder of Site 300 is closed for high
explosive tests. This would place NDERF relatively close to public areas; in this case the
potential impact would be lessened only by the relatively lower population density near the
general services area. In addition, the existing road between Site 300 and Livermore is two
lanes through the hills with many sharp turns. There would be potential environmental
and safety issues associated with the daily commute from Livermore to Site 300 of the more
than 400 personnel working in NDERF.

5.5 EFFECTS OF THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE

This subsection analyzes and discusses the effects of construction and operation of
the preferred alternative on the environment. Chemical and engineering operations are
known and their impacts have been assessed. Although laboratory space would be
designated for experimental physics operations, no specific operations have been
determined. It is expected that experimental physics operations would not involve
hazardous materials, thus no additional adverse impacts are expected due to experimental
physics operations.
In evaluating the preferred alternative, while not specifically noted, the potential
impacts to personnel in nearby (existing) facilities were considered. For this purpose, the
EPRG-2 guidelines discussed in Section 5.5.2 were used to evaluate the risk to on-site
personnel. The calculations in that section show the risk to be within the guidelines. With
regard to routine releases discussed in Section 5.5.1, exposure to on-site personnel is
25
calculated to be within all applicable guidelines. A further evaluation of this risk will be
made as part of the safety analysis document to be completed prior to the operation of the
facility. This safety analysis will demonstrate that the consequences of accidents will be
limited by design basis, engineering safety features and hazardous material inventories.
The potential environmental effects common to both NDERF and NTTC are
discussed in the NTTC EA (US DOE, 1988a). The subject areas common to both facilities
that were found not to be significant were land use, socioeconomics, vegetation, water
resources, rare and endangered species, cultural and historical resources, and parking
and traffic during construction. The following subsections address potential effects
unique to NDERF and include that analysis of a worst-case accident. Conditions specified
for these analyses are consistent with a maximum credible accident having a probability
of less than one in a million (Vogt, 1989).

5.5.1 Routine Releases
5.5.1.1 Parts-Cleaning Operations.

Parts-cleaning operations, using 1,1,1-trichloro-
ethane described in Section 4.2, would require a permit from the Bay Area Air Quality
Management District (BAAQMD).
Given the small quantities of parts-cleaner used (parts-cleaner capacity is 19 L),
the amount that could be released to the atmosphere, and the design and control of the
operations, parts-cleaning operations would not significantly impact the environment.

5.5.1.2 Fugitive Chemical Releases.

Normal chemical operations in NDERF may, from
time to time, cause the transient or fugitive release of small quantities of standard
laboratory solvents and other volatile chemicals, including hazardous chemicals. To
minimize fugitive releases, LLNL operational procedures require that these substances
would be used in closed containers whenever possible and that waste chemicals would be
stored in holding tanks or small carboy containers. The operations would be performed by
trained chemical personnel. Their activities would be determined by good laboratory
practices and OSPs, as necessary.
The following analysis and discussion demonstrates that the total cancer risk
associated with fugitive emissions from NDERF would be 2.1 x 10^-8. This value indicates
a worst-case risk of cancer to be 1 in 50,000,000, which is 2.1% of the 1 x 10-6 risk level
26
recommended by the California Air Pollution Control Officers Association. Thus, the
cancer risk associated with possible fugitive releases as a result of NDERF operations
would not be significant.
The operations that may generate fugitive hazardous chemical vapors would be
performed in exhaust hoods to protect the operators from the vapors. The ventilation system
for these areas would supply air on a once-through basis with no recirculation, thereby
decreasing the risk to the operator in the event of a fugitive release. To ensure a safe
operations area, the exhaust hood for perchloric-acid operations would have a wash-down
system to prevent corrosion, and exhaust air will be exhausted separately from the
laboratory through a dedicated stack. Also, where appropriate, the air would be HEPA-
filtered before it is released into the atmosphere to prevent the release of toxic particulates to
the environment.
Potential fugitive releases also would be reviewed and, when appropriate, analysis
of new formulations to determine the potential for toxic chemicals to be released as a gas
from these formulations during the engineering operations would be preferred. As a result
of this review process, formulations that would generate significant quantities of toxic
gases would not be transferred to the engineering operations.
Chemicals identified as air toxics (Calif. Health and Safety Code 44321) that would
be associated with NDERF operations are listed in Table 5.5.1.2-1. Of the listed chemicals,
eight have had a unit carcinogenic risk value assigned by the California Air Resources
Board. A screening cancer risk assessment was performed on these eight chemicals
(Rogozen, 1988). The assessment utilized the methods specified in the California Air
Pollution Control Officers Association's Air Toxics Assessment Manual (CAPCOA, 1987).
The dispersion of chemicals was modeled by the PTPLU Gaussian-dispersion computer
code, which adheres to guidelines established by the California Air Pollution Control
Officers Association (CAPCOA, 1987) and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District
(BAAQMD, 1988) for dispersion modeling codes. In summary, data were annualized to an
annual average concentration (ug/m3), and the appropriate unit carcinogenic risk value
(probability of cancer per ug/m3 of exposure) was applied resulting in an estimate of the
carcinogenic risk from the eight chemicals.
The model was run, for scaling purposes, once for each combination of stability
class, wind speed, and mixing height with a unitized release rate of 1 g/s. Input para-
27

Table 5.5.1.2.-1 Chemicals identified as air toxics and their estimated release rates.

Chemical Name Release rate (g/month)
Acetamide 1
Acrylamide 1
Ammonia 10
Benzenea 200
Bromine 5
Bromine-containing inorganic compounds 10
Carbon tetrachloridea 100
Chlorine 1
Chlorobenzene 5
Chloroform^a 200
Dimethylamine 0.1
1,4-dioxane 40
Ethylene dichloridea 5
Formaldehyde^a,b 500
Hexamethylphosphoramide 10
Hydrochloric acid 300
Hydrocyanic acid 5
Hydrogen fluoride 100
Mercury 5
Methanol^b 50,000
Methyl methacrylate 1
Methylene chloridea 500
4,4'-methylene dianailine (& dichloride) 1
Methyliodide 5
Mineral oils 5
Nickel compounds^a 1
Phenol 5
Phthalic anhydride 0.1
Styrene 50
Toluene 50
Trichloroethylene^a 5
Vinyl bromide 1
Xylenes 100
^aChemicals for which a unit carcinogenic risk value has been determined by the
California Air Resources Board.
^bThe methanol releases mostly are from evaporation processes. The formaldehyde
estimate includes that arising from the decomposition of organic polymers.
28
meters and unitized output are presented in Table 5.5.1.2-2. The resultant maximum
concentrations and their downwind point of occurrence were determined (Table 5.5.1.2-2).
The worst-case atmospheric conditions were chosen (stability class D) and an
annual average concentration (ug/m^3) was determined for each chemical (Table 5.5.1.2-
3). The unit risk values then were applied yielding the estimated risk associated with the
fugitive emission of each chemical.
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) considers a risk for any chemical
and the combined risk for all chemicals of 1 x 10^-6 probability of a cancer effect or less to be
acceptable. None of the chemicals assessed has a risk greater than 7.8 x 10^-9, and the total
risk associated with these chemicals is 2.1 x 10^-8, which are both well below the CARB
level. Safety designs proposed continued implementation of OSPs, and the fact that the
individual operations are small in scale will ensure that fugitive releases from these
operations result in insignificant risk and will not significantly affect the environment.

5.5.2 Accident-Related Releases
5.5.2.1 Radiological Exposure of Workers or the Public.

NDERF operations would include
the use of naturally occurring radioisotopes, bonded or sealed radioisotope sources, and
x-ray generating machines. The impacts of these proposed operations are presented in this
subsection; the analysis demonstrates that the impacts would not be significant. No off-
site exposure from operations involving naturally occurring heavy-metal radioisotopes or
x-ray generating machines would occur. An analysis of a postulated worst-case accident
of 85Kr release from a sealed source demonstrates that the maximum dose to an off-site
individual would be 0.0003% of the standard (as discussed below) established for
occasional exposure to the public (US DOE, 1987).
Heavy-metal radioisotopes that would be used in NDERF have very low specific
activities. Their radiation hazard is insignificant in comparison to their chemical
toxicity, which is discussed in Section 5.5.3.2, "Toxic Metal Releases."
Sources of potential radiation exposure would be associated with NDERF operations
involving x-ray generating machines and bonded or sealed sources for calibration.
Operators would be shielded from exposure during operations and, where appropriate, the
29

Table 5.5.1.2-2 Dispersion modeling input parameters and unitized output for estimation of risk from fugitive releases.

Input:
Stack height (m) 25
Stack gas temperature (K) 294
Stack gas velocity (m/s) 14.6
Stack diameter (m) 2.44
Ambient temperature (K) 294
Unitized release rate (g/s) 1
Output:
Stability Wind Mixing Point of maximum Maximum downwind
class* speed height concentration concentration
(m/s) (m) (km) (ug/m^3)
A 1.5 500 0.4 13.15
B 3.0 400 0.4 12.96
C 4.0 300 0.5 13.15
D 4.0 50 1.0 19.35
E 2.0 200 1.7 12.47
F 2.0 100 3.0 9.37
* Stability classes graded from very unstable, class A, through very stable which is class F.

Table 5.5.1.2-3 Estimates of annual average concentrations and risk associated with NDERF chemical operations.

Chemical Hourly average Annual average Unit risk Risk
emissions concentration value
(g/s) (ug/m3) (ug/m3)-1
Benzene 7.6 x 10-5 1.5 x 10^-4 5.3 x 10^-5 7.8 x 10^-9
Carbon Tetrachloride 3.8 x 10-5 7.4 x 10^-5 4.2 x 10^-5 3.1 x 10^-9
Chloroform 7.6 x 10-5 1.5 x 10^-4 2.3 x 10^-5 3.4 x 10^-9
Ethylene Dichloride 1.9 x 10-6 3.7 x 10^-6 2.2 x 10^-5 8.1 x 10^-11
Formaldehyde 1.9 x 10^-4 3.7 x 10^-4 1.3 x 10^-5 4.8 x 10^-9
Methylene Chloride 1.9 x 10^-4 3.7 x 10^-4 4.1 x 10^-6 1.5 x 10^-9
Nickel Compounds 3.8 x 10-7 7.4 x 10^-7 2.4 x 10^-4 1.8 x 10^-10
Trichloroethylene 1.9 x 10-6 3.7 x 10^-6 1.3 x 10^-6 4.8 x 10^-12
Total Risk 2.1 x 10^-8
30
machines would have safety interlocks to prevent worker access to the irradiation area
during operation. LLNL has a program (LLNL, 1987c, Supple. 33.011) that monitors
worker exposures and limits exposure to less than the acceptable DOE guidelines of 5 rem
per year to the whole body (US DOE, 1988b).
Krypton gas, as 85Kr, would be one of the sources used in calibration operations and
would present the greatest risk in a worst-case accident scenario of the four radioactive
sources presented in Table 4.2-1. The gas would be housed in a titanium container with a
0.001-inch-thick titanium end window that permits the beta radiation to pass. Six krypton
sources are planned to be associated with the beta gaging activities. When the sources are
not in regular use they would be stored in shielded containers in the Building 231 vault. A
fire could result in the failure of the containment for one or more sources.
Subsequent analysis discusses the impact of failure of one of the six 85Kr sources.
If the failure of more than one source were to be involved, estimates of consequences should
be multiplied by the number of failed sources up to a maximum of six sources. Were the
titanium containment to fail, 0.25 Ci of 85Kr would be released into the production
characterization laboratory and mix with the air in the building ventilation system. The
ventilation system for the production characterization laboratory would be designed to
exchange the room air 30 times an hour. Moreover, 13% of the room exhaust air would be
exhausted without re-circulation.
The release of ^85Kr gas caused by an event that disabled the ventilation system
would not result in the dispersal of gas to off-site individuals under worst-case conditions.
With the ventilation system disabled, gas would be more slowly diluted in and around the
facility. There would be no force moving the air other than natural diffusion. Uninvolved
NDERF personnel in other laboratories and offices would be exposed less and the release
would result in still lower estimated doses to off-site individuals. Therefore, it is assumed
that worst-case conditions occur when the ventilation system continues to function during
the release. Air in the production-characterization laboratory flows from ceiling inlets to
return outlets at the base of the walls at a rate of approximately 1.5 m (5 ft) per min,
developing a flow of air that flushes the room with minimal turbulence.
It is assumed for the analysis that the titanium capsule fails in either of two room
locations, when it is in the general room space (Scenario A), or when it is in one of the
operational cabinets (Scenario B). The release is assumed to be complete in 1 minute.
31
Analysis of these scenarios demonstrates that in the unlikely event of an accident causing
the release of ^85Kr, the effect on LLNL personnel and the public would not be significant.
Scenario A. Under scenario A, ^85Kr gas is released in the production
characterization laboratory, mixes with room-air, and recirculates through the facility
return-air plenum. The laboratory would receive recirculated air at a rate of 30 air
exchanges per hour or one air exchange every 2 minutes. The entire amount of gas
(0.25 Ci) would completely mix in the return-air plenum (8915 m^3/min, 314 790 ft^3/min)
and within 2 minutes would be distributed homogeneously throughout those NDERF areas
receiving recirculated air. The maximum air concentration in the facility would be
1.4 10-^5 Ci/m^3 (4.1X x 10-^7 Ci/ft^3). If all six sources were involved, the maximum air
concentration would be 8.4 x 10-^5 Ci/m^3 for a few minutes. The maximum permissible
concentration (MPC) in air for occupational exposure is 1.0 x 10-^5 Ci/m^3. (Occupational
MPC is based on the amount of a radionuclide that a worker can be exposed to continuously
for a 40-hr work week without exceeding the yearly occupational dose limit of 500 mrem.)
This analysis predicts that NDERF personnel would be exposed to a concentration
of ^85Kr gas at slightly above the MPC for the first 2 minutes after the release. After this
initial period, the concentration would decrease as the recirculated air was exhausted and
replaced with fresh air. Therefore, if this unlikely release were to occur, it would not have
a significant impact on personnel inside NDERF.
Scenario B. Under scenario B, ^85Kr gas is released while the source is in an
operational cabinet; it does not mix with the room air, but is exhausted to the stack where it
is dispersed as a plume. The dispersion of the plume was analyzed using the MATHEW/
ADPIC calculational model developed at LLNL and used as part of the DOE's Atmospheric
Release Advisory Capability (ARAC). The physical specifications of this release scenario
are presented in Table 5.5.2.1-1 and the computer model input values are presented in
Table 5.5.2.1-2. The air concentrations calculated were converted to radiological dose (in
rem) using methodologies developed by the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP, 1980).
Maximum potential downwind exposures to off-site individuals from the release of
0.25 Ci of ^85Kr for various meteorological conditions are presented in Table 5.5.2.1-3.
This analysis determined the maximum doses (in rem) for three wind speeds (0.5, 1.0, and
2.5 m/s) and three atmospheric stability classes (very unstable, neutral, and very stable).
32

Table 5.5.2.1.-1 Physical specifications of ^85Kr worst-case accidental release analysis.

Room volume 35 200ft^3 (997m^3)
Ventilation
Supply 17 600 ft^3/min (498 m^3/min)
Percent to re-circulation 87%
Percent to stack 13%
Re-circulation changes/h 30
Facility-return
air plenum 314 790 ft^3/min (8915 m^3/min)
Facility exhaust
to stack 39 810 ft^3/min (1227 m^3/min)
Radiation source
Amount 0.25 Ci
Major emissions 0.67 MeV Beta
Critical organ Skin

Table 5.5.2.1.-2 Input parameters for ^85Kr dispersion modeling.

1. Nuclide ^85Kr
2. Activity (Ci) 0.25
3. Release fraction 1.00
4. Percent filtration 0.00%
5. Release height (m) 25
6. Atmospheric stability variable
7. Wind speed variable
Output: Doses are reported as 50-y committed doses to the skin. Doses to the lungs are
approximately 0.01% of the dose to the skin, and the whole body equivalent dose is
approximately 0.1% of the skin dose.
33

Table 5.5.2.1-3 Maximum potential downwind dose to off-site individuals from the release of 0.25 Ci of 85Kr for various meteorological conditions.

Stability Wind speed Maximum downwind Distance from
(m/s) dose **(rem) release point (km)
0.5
A 6.3 x 10^-8 0.2
D 4.5 x 10^-8 0.2
F 3.1 x 10^-8 0.8
1.0
A 4.2 x 10^-8 0.1
D 3.0 x 10^-8 0.2
F 1.5 x 10^-7 0.7
2.5
A 1.4 x 10^-8 0.1
D 1.1 x 10^-8 0.2
F 4.3 x 10^-8 0.8
* Stability class A is very unstable, class D is neutral, and class F is very stable.
**The maximum downwind dose is the dose integrated over the puff release passage.
The highest dose estimated was 1.5 x 10^-7 rem at 0.7 km downwind of the facility stack.
The DOE radiation standard to the public is 0.5 rem/y for exposure due to an unusual
occurrence (US DOE, 1988b, US DOE, 1987). The predicted dose from such an extremely
unlikely release is 0.00003% of the occasional exposure limit if one source is involved, and
six times this value, or 0.00018% of the standard if six sources are involved. The DOE
occupational limit for routine exposure to radiation for workers is 5.0 rem/y; the predicted
dose to workers would be 0.000003% of that limit for one source and 0.000018% of that limit
for six sources. Therefore, the impact would not be significant.
5.5.2.2 Toxic Metal Releases. Materials produced by chemical operations would be
machined through mechanical engineering operations into finished parts. The parts
would contain toxic metal compounds in solid form. Toxic metals would not be released
during normal operations. The special design of the ventilation system would minimize
34
worker exposure to these metals, and all exhaust air would be HEPA-filtered to prevent
release to the environment.
The following discussion includes a postulated worst-case accident analysis,
which estimates the maximum concentration of toxic metals that individuals would be
exposed to during an uncontrolled fire in the facility. Also, the facility designs and the
operational procedures that prevent an uncontrolled fire and release of toxic metal from
occurring are discussed. The worst-case accident analysis demonstrates that the
maximally affected individual would be exposed to a maximum concentration of
0.08 mg/m^3 of air. This level of exposure during the course of the accidental release is
considered to be acceptable as determined by the LLNL Emergency Response Planning
Guidelines (ERPG). Most of the toxic metals considered for use in NDERF have LLNL
ERPG level 1 values of approximately 1 mg/m^3. LLNL ERPG level 1 is the maximum
airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be
exposed for up to one hour without experiencing adverse health effects (other than mild
transient effects or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odor). These exposures are
considered to have insignificant health consequences. Also, information is presented that
demonstrates that in the unlikely event of a fire in a laboratory in NDERF, the magnitude
or the consequences of the fire would not be as great as the worst-case accident analysis.
Thus, the environmental impacts of NDERF toxic-metal operations would be within
acceptable levels and not be significant.
A more detailed discussion of toxic metal releases and operations is contained in
Appendix B, which is classified and not included in this document. This additional
information describes and evaluates the toxic metal operations. It does not differ
significantly from information presented here, and supports the findings of the
assessment.
Machining operations generate fine particles and dust. To minimize potential
occupational exposure, exposure to other LLNL personnel, and release into the environ-
ment, these operations would be performed in closed cabinets. The cabinets are designed to
maintain the flow of room air into the cabinet and to exhaust the particulates and dust
through a HEPA-filtered exhaust system. As an additional safety measure, room air
would be diluted and exchanged several times an hour to decrease potential operator
exposure and, in those laboratories where toxic-metal particulates may be generated, room
exhaust air also would be HEPA-filtered. Since it has been determined that no significant
35
release of toxic gases would occur during machining operations, no toxic gases would be
exhausted during the machining operation (see Section 5.5.1.2).
Although highly unlikely, fire could cause an accidental release of these toxic
metals. To safeguard the containment system in the event of a fire, certain designs are
proposed to be included in the facility. The HEPA-filtered ventilation systems would be
constructed of noncombustible material, and the area containing the system duct work and
filter assemblies would be protected further from fire by water sprinklers. The operational
areas also would be protected from fire by water sprinklers. Toxic metal compounds would
be stored in fire-resistant cabinets. Parts and assemblies would be stored in concrete-
enclosed rooms (IN-1 and AS-1) to help maintain thermal stability in the event of a power
outage. Individual assemblies would be stored in metal containers in AS-1. These storage
rooms are less likely to be involved in a fire originating either in the storage room or
nearby because of the design of the concrete walls and grout ceilings and the lack of an
ignition source.
Not all natural disasters would provide a mechanism to disperse solid toxic
material. For example, an earthquake could be of sufficient magnitude to cause
containment and safety features to fail, yet still not provide a mechanism to disperse the
solid toxic material. The most likely accident scenario to disperse toxic material is not an
earthquake, but rather an earthquake-induced fire. An Emergency Operations Center has
been created at LLNL to coordinate emergency control activities and to centralize
management control and emergency communications during an emergency, such as a
major earthquake (Freeland, 1984). In addition, LLNL has completed extensive
investigations and studies to ensure the seismic integrity of existing facilities (Scheimer,
1985; Tokarz and Shaw, 1980). This work has included both defining a design-basis
earthquake for the site and making structural analyses to evaluate the integrity of such
built-in safeguards as fire sprinklers. If an emergency occurred, such as a fire in
NDERF, the LLNL Fire Department Incident Commander would also take appropriate
action to block traffic and remove any bystanders to a place of safety. The LLNL Fire
Department's standard tactical priorities include the consideration of the safety of the
public and establishment of safety zones. Establishment of a safety zone around NDERF
would restrict access to the public roads, Mesquite Way (a.k.a. Mesquite Gate Drive), East
Avenue, and Vasco Road, as appropriate (Sharry,1988).
36
To assess the potential impacts of NDERF operations, a worst-case accidental
release scenario was developed. NDERF is designed to be a research and development
facility where specific laboratory operations would change from time to time; thus, the
amount of toxic solid materials in NDERF would vary with time and programmatic
requirements. This analysis assumes that storage of toxic metal materials in concrete-
enclosed rooms presents a low risk as compared with use of these materials in chemical
and engineering operations. Therefore, operations laboratories were chosen for worst-
case accident analysis. The worst-case accidental release would be caused by a localized
fire in the room(s) containing the greatest amounts of toxic material at risk. It is assumed
that the exhaust ventilation system would be impaired such that toxic emissions and smoke
would not be HEPA filtered or released through the 25-m exhaust stack. It also is assumed
that the fire would not impair the supply ventilation, thus sufficient air would be available
to allow complete development of the fire. This assumption tends to increase the
consequences of the worst-case accident analysis. The duration of the fire was estimated
using the Harmathy equations (Harmathy, 1972), assuming a conservative combustible
material loading of 15 kg/m^2. Table 5.5.2.2-1 presents the room specifications, fire
duration, and toxic-metal release rate from each of two chemistry laboratories (P-2 and
K - 1) and an engineering laboratory, (A- 1). At the temperatures expected for a laboratory
fire, greater than 538 C (1000 F), metal compounds would decompose into the metal oxide or
elemental form. It also is assumed that the air would be loaded with the toxic-metal dust to
a level of 100 mg/m^3. This assumption is based on the studies of the behavior of mixed
oxides under various conditions and represents the maximum loading of air during a fire
(Elder et al. 1986; Selby et al. 1975). The release is assumed to be continuous at the assumed
release rate for the duration of the fire. Review of operations planned for NDERF indicates
that the amount of toxic metal potentially released (i.e., rate of release, mg/min, over the
duration of the fire, min) by credible accidents would not exceed the amount released by the
worst-case accidental-release scenario.
Dispersion of these releases was modeled using the Environmental Protection
Agency approved code, Inpuff (version 2.0), with the meteorology and physical-input
parameters presented in Table 5.5.2.2-2. The results of modeling are presented in
Table 5.5.2.2-3 for chemistry laboratories P-2 and K-1, and Table 5.5.2.2-4 for engineering
laboratory A - 1.
Consequences of the worst-case accidental-release scenario were estimated in the
absence of federal, state, or local regulatory guidance. The American Industrial Hygiene
37

Table 5.5.2.2-1 Room specifications and event parameters for the toxic-metal worst-case accidental release scenario.

Room Area Volume Fire duration Ventilation Toxic-metal release
(m2) (m3) (min) rate (m3/min) rate (g/s)a
P-2 70 212 46 109 0.18
K-1 56 170 37 109 0.18
A-1 279 1020 183 1699 2.83
^aThe toxic metal release rate was estimated from the ventilation rate for the individual
rooms continuously loaded to 100 mg/m^3 of toxic metal.

Table 5.5.2.2-2 Meteorological and physical input parameters of the worst-case accidental dispersion analysis.

Room Release Release Release Wind speed Stability
area (m2) height (m) rate (g/s) (m/sec) class a
P-2 314 10 0.18 1.0 worst
K-1 314 10 0.18 1.0 worst
A-1 1256 0 2.83 1.0 worst
^aAll stability classes, A through F, were analyzed and the stability class for the highest
concentration at every downwind distance is reported.
38

Table 5.5.2.2-3 Estimates of maximum downwind toxic-metal concentration and distance for three wind speeds and all atmospheric stability classes for chemistry laboratories P-2 or K-1 at a release height of 10 m.

Stability Wind speed Highest downwind Distance from
class * (m/s) concentration (mg/m^3) release point (km)
0.5
A 0.03 0.1
B 0.04 0.2
C 0.05 0.3
D-D 0.04 0.5
D-N 0.02 0.9
E 0.02 1.2
F 0.02 1.5
1.0
A 0.02 0.1
B 0.02 0.2
C 0.02 0.3
D-D 0.02 0.6
D-N 0.006 1.0
E 0.006 1.2
F 0.007 1.5
2.5
A 0.03 0.1
B 0.05 0.1
C 0.06 0.1
D-D 0.06 0.1
D-N 0.02 0.4
E 0.005 0.8
F 0.002 2.0
* Stability classes are established for very unstable meteorological conditions, class A,
through very stable conditions, class F, with class D considered neutral meteorology.
Class D stability is subdivided into neutral stability, day (Class D-D) and neutral stability,
night (Class D-N).
39

Table 5.5.2.2-4 Estimates of maximum downwind toxic-metal concentration and distance for three wind speeds and all atmospheric stability classes for a ground-level release from the engineering laboratory, A-1.

Stability Wind speed Highest downwind Distance from
class * (m/s) concentration (mg/m^3) release point (km)
0.5
A 0.08 0.5
B 0.08 0.6
C 0.07 1.0
D-D 0.06 2.0
D-N 0.02 5.0
E 0.07 2.5
F 0.08 4.0
1.0
A 0.04 0.4
B 0.04 0.7
C 0.03 1.0
D-D 0.02 2.5
D-N 0.008 5.0
E 0.03 2.5
F 0.03 4.0
2.5
A 0.06 0.2
B 0.06 0.3
C 0.05 0.5
D-D 0.03 1.2
D-N 0.01 2.0
E 0.01 3.0
F 0.008 5.0
* Stability classes are established for very unstable meteorological conditions, class A,
through very stable conditions, class F, with class D considered neutral meteorology.
Class D stability is subdivided into neutral stability, day (Class D-D) and neutral stability,
night (Class D-N).
40
Association (AIHA) is developing Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) for
the purpose of estimating the seriousness of consequences of accidental releases. To date,
AIHA has developed ERPG levels for 12 chemicals and is developing guidelines for 17
more. LLNL has adopted the AIHA recommendations for establishing these guidelines
and has developed ERPG levels for the metal compounds to be used in NDERF operations.
The ERPGs are being established as tentative or interim values until they are formally
established by the AIHA. Although there is no precise model for establishing these
concentrations, the same ERPG definitions used by AIHA are being used by LLNL to
define impacts associated with an accidental release. This process involves reviewing
available human and animal exposure data to make a judgment about assigned
concentrations. At a minimum, the following references are consulted: Registry of Toxic
Effects of Chemicals (Lewis and Tatken, 1982) and the Documentation of the Threshold
Limit Values (ACGIH, 1986).
The ERPG- 1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing
other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined
objectionable odor.
The ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or
developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could
impair an individual's ability to take protective action.
The ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or
developing life-threatening health effects.
It is the policy of the Hazards Control Department of LLNL that for exposures
following accidental releases, those directly involved with the operation and others on-site
should not exceed ERPG-2 concentrations and off-site exposure should not exceed ERPG- 1
concentrations.
In general, all of the toxic metals considered for use in NDERF operations have
ERPG-1 levels ranging from 0.05 mg/m^3 to 1.0 mg/m^3; most of these toxic metals have
ERPG-1 levels of 1.0 mg/m^3. The dispersion analysis estimates that for an uncontrolled
41
fire in laboratory K-1 or P2, the maximum off-site concentration would be 0.05 mg/m^3 at a
distance of 0.3 km, stability class C meteorology, and wind speed of 0.5 m/s. The
maximum off-site concentration from a fire in laboratory A-1 would be 0.08 mg/m^3 at a
wind speed of 0.5 m/s at various downwind distance depending on the stability class. Both
of these exposure estimates for off-site individuals approximate the lowest ERPG-1 level of
0.05 mg/m^3; thus it is believed that all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour
without experiencing adverse health effects (other than mild transient effects or perceiving
a clearly defined, objectionable odor). As a result, exposures from worst-case scenarios
are considered to have insignificant health consequences.
Accident scenarios based on specific initiators and specific source terms would not
result in the release of more of the toxic metal material than the worst-case scenario.
During chemical operations, as would occur in P-2 and K-1, toxic metal compounds would
be stored in small quantities in fire-resistance cabinets to reduce the quantity of material
at risk; the quantity used would be restricted by OSPs to amounts that have been determined
to be safe and that would not result in off-site concentrations greater than the ERPG- 1 level
should there be a release. Also, NDERF operations would be performed in accordance with
a safety and health plan, whose components are listed in Section 5.5.2.3.
The assumption that air in the laboratory involved in the fire is continuously
loaded with toxic metal oxide to 100 mg/m^3 is very conservative (Selby et al., 1975). To
attain this concentration, even for a few minutes, would require a fire and an explosion of
a sealed container containing the metal oxide. Maintaining this air concentration for the
duration of the fire (i.e., 46 to 183 min depending on the laboratory involved) would require
a huge energy source. Review of facility design and operations proposed for the facility
reveals that such a source of energy would not exist in NDERF.
In laboratories like A-1, toxic-metal compounds would be of several compounds
formed into solid blocks or parts. These would be stored in individual plastic boxes or
metal containers in concrete-enclosed rooms IN-1 and AS-1. In laboratories like P-2 or K-
1, toxic-metal compounds would be stored in fire-resistance cabinets. Machining or
handling accidents that could occur in P-2 or K-1 may result in the instantaneous release
of some small amounts of solids, but these amounts would be less than that released by the
worst-case analysis. A fire in A-1, P-2, or K-1 could involve more material than
machining or handling accidents, but as stated above, it would be impossible to sustain the
airborne concentration assumed for the worst-case accidental-release analysis during the
42
assumed uncontrolled fire. NDERF would, like all LLNL facilities, have a fire-
suppression system and emergency-response plans would be established to prevent the
possibility of an uncontrolled fire. A credible fire scenario would result in less toxic
material being released to the environment at a lower concentration than predicted here.
Taken together, the physical form of the toxic metal, the operational safety and
emergency-response procedures, and the design of the facility would be sufficient to
mitigate the impacts of a release of toxic metals to the environment. Therefore, operations
involving toxic metals would not significantly impact the environment.

5.5.2.3 Fluorine Gas Releases.

Fluorine gas would be used in operations of up to six
krypton-fluorine lasers. Routine operations and maintenance activities result in the
release of laser gas (the only toxic component is fluorine) through a halogen absorber that
would remove fluorine before the gas is released into the atmosphere. The lasers would be
installed as three groups of two. Each group would have its own separate fluorine reserves.
The pressurized fluorine gas cylinders would be stored in a separately vented outside
cabinet specifically designed for their storage. Exhaust from these cabinets would,
therefore, not be mixed with the laboratory air or the laboratory exhaust. Krypton-fluorine
laser machining presently is performed at LLNL. The design of the laser, as well as the
standard operating procedures and controls already established for such operations,
prevents the release of fluorine gas.
Fluorine gas reserves for each group would be contained in standard pressure
cylinders at dilute concentrations (5% by weight). Two cylinders containing 38 g of
-fluorine gas usually are associated with the operation at any one time. An accidental
release of fluorine gas constitutes a potential health concern because exposure could result
in eye and respiratory irritation, as well as other health hazards. The proper handling of
toxic gases to prevent an accidental release would be determined by a Hazards Control
Department Safety Team.
General guidance for pressure-vessel and system design and for safe-handling
procedures for toxic gases is found in the LLNL's Health and Safety Manual, Supplements
32.02 to 32.03 and 21. 12, respectively (LLNL, 1987c). Supplements 32.02 and 32.03 provide
pressure system designers and experimenters with technical guidance by detailing
criteria for the design of both manned and remotely operated pressure systems. The
criteria include material selection, welding guidance, a calculational guide for ductile
43
vessels, and testing of pressure vessels. Guidance also is provided for seismic design and
design of enclosures for gas-pressurized vessels to protect personnel from pressure-vessel
failure hazards such as blast pressure, flying fragments, and the release of hazardous
materials into the atmosphere. Other mitigation measures include double valving; the use
of welded rather than jointed tubing; remotely controlled, ventilated enclosures; and
restricted access.
An analysis was performed to assess the highly unlikely event of an accidental
release of the entire inventory of fluorine gas for one group of two lasers (38 g). This
analysis assumes that a valve fails, resulting in the release of the 38 g of fluorine gas from
the facility. The gas would be exhausted separately to the facility stack in one minute
where it would be dispersed as a plume. The dispersion of the plume was analyzed by the
Gaussian-dispersion computer code, Inpuff (version 2.0) using the input parameters
presented in Table 5.5.2.3-1.
Table 5.5.2.3-2 presents the maximum downwind concentrations and distances
predicted for the release. This analysis demonstrates that impacts from the release would
not be significant. The highest concentration, 0.067 ppm (at 0.30 km), would be below the
LLNL-ERPG-1 level of 2 ppm. In the extremely unlikely event of all three separate
reserves failing simultaneously, the release would result in a maximum exposure three
times those presented (0.201 ppm) and it too would be below the LLNLERPG-1 level for
fluorine.
Taken together, the implementation of design and fabrication criteria for pressure
systems and the establishment of standard operating procedures (including OSPs) and
controls are adequate to prevent the inadvertent release of fluorine gas into the environ-
ment. Also, potential health effects would likely be insignificant if there were a release.
Therefore, this operation would not significantly impact the environment.

5.5.3 General Operations
5.5.3.1 Growth-Inducing Impacts Growth projections

for LLNL (LLNL, 1988a) predict a
relatively constant number of personnel over the next 5 years (an average annual increase
of less than 0.5%). The NDERF project would consolidate existing operations, utilizing
existing LLNL personnel; no significant increase in manpower and associated growth-
inducing impacts would be expected as a result of NDERF operations. Therefore, no
44

Table 5.5.2.3-1 Input parameters for worst-case accidental release analysis for fluorine gas.

1. Chemical fluorine (F2)
2. Amount Released (g) 38
3. Release Height (m) 25
4. Mechanical Plume Rise (m/s) 0.0
5. Release Duration (min) 1
6. Atmospheric stability worst-case ^a
7. Wind speed (m/s) 1.0
^aAll stability classes (A through F) are analyzed simultaneously and the highest
concentration for each downwind distance is reported.

Table 5.5.2.3-2 Maximum downwind concentrations and distances predicted from the release of fluorine gas under worst-case meteorological conditions.

Downwind Maximum Stability
distance concentration class^a
(km) (ppm)
0.10 0.0026 A
0.20 0.064 A
0.30 0.067 B
0.40 0.059 B
0.50 0.056 C
0.60 0.054 C
0.70 0.055 C
0.80 0.051 C
0.90 0.047 D
1.00 0.043 D
2.00 0.030 E
3.00 0.023 E
4.00 0.021 E
5.00 0.018 E
6.00 0.016 F
7.00 0.014 F
8.00 0.013 F
9.00 0.011 F
10.0 0.011 F
^aStability classes are graded from very unstable through very stable atmospheric
conditions. Class A is very unstable, class D is neutral, and class F is very stable.
45
adverse impacts would be expected on the City of Livermore or its surrounding
communities with respect to increased demand for housing, schools, roads, or other
similar socioeconomic effects associated with growth-inducing impacts.

5.5.3.2 Central Plant Emissions.

NTTC and NDERF would share central plant facilities
such as boilers and cooling towers. These operations have been discussed previously in the
NTTC EA (US DOE, 1988a). It was concluded that the 5.4% increase in emissions from
LLNL resulting from the operation of the NTTC/NDERF central plant would not be
significant.

5.5.3.3 Construction Activities.

Construction noise would be expected for the NDERF/
NTTC project. These noises are transitory and would not be expected to be excessive except
in the actual construction area. The effects of construction on soil erosion would be
mitigated by channeling runoff and by minimizing wind-driven dust by sprinkling the
site with water. A more complete discussion of these issues is presented in the NTTC EA
(US DOE, 1988a).

5.5.3.4 Hazardous Waste Generation.

NDERF operations would generate liquid and solid
wastes. A detailed discussion of hazardous waste generation, including types and
amounts of waste generated, is presented in Appendix B, which is classified. This
additional information describes and evaluates hazardous waste generation. It does not
significantly differ from the information presented here, and supports the findings of the
assessment.
Liquid wastes would include acids, solvents, heavy-metal solutions, cyanide
solutions, and film-processing chemicals. It is anticipated that solid wastes would
continue to be generated on an irregular basis. As discussed in Section 4.3, unclassified
wastes would include paper and plastic products contaminated from salt and foam
operations, methanol, isopropyl alcohol, freon, and acetone. Liquid wastes would be
accumulated in retention tanks or small carboys; solid wastes would be accumulated in
drums. Because many of the waste-generating operations currently are being performed
at the Livermore site, the net amount of waste would not significantly increase as a result
of operations performed in NDERF. Wastes will be controlled by LLNL's Environmental
Protection and Hazards Control Departments and will be stored, treated, and disposed of in
accordance with federal, state, and local regulations (see Table 5.5.3.4-1).
46

Table 5.5.3.4-1. Applicable federal and state regulations governing hazardous waste.

Name Regulation Topic
U.S. Department DOE 5400.2 DOE Environmental Policy
of Energy Orders DOE 5480.5 Safety of Nuclear Facilities
DOE 5820.2 Radioactive Waste Management
DOE 5480.1A Environmental & Health Protection
DOE 5484.2 Unusual Occurrence Reporting
U.S. Statutes 42 USC 7401 et seq. Clean Air Act
and Regulations 40 CFR 50 et seq.
33 USC 1251 et seq. Clean Water Act
40 CFR 110-140
40CFR400-470
42 USC 300f et seq. Safe Drinking Water Act
40 CFR 141 et seq.
7 USC 135 et seq. Federal Insecticide Fungicide &
40 CFR 150 et seq. Rodenticide Act
15 USC 2601 et seq. Toxic Substance Control Act
40 CFR 700 et seq.
49 USC 1801 et seq. Hazardous Material Transportation
49 CFR 106-107 Act
49 CFR 171-179
49 CFR 190-195
49CFR209 & 397
42 USC 6901 et seq. Resource Conservation Recovery
40 CFR 260 et seq. Act
42 USC 9601 et seq. Comprehensive Environmental
40 CFR 300 et seq. Response Compensation &
Liability Act
State of California CA. Water Code Porter-Cologne Water Quality Act
Statutes and *13000 et seq.
Regulations Title 23 CAC Ch. 3
H & S Code Hazardous Waste Control Act
*25 100 et seq.
Title 22 CAC Div. 4
Ch. 30
H & S Code Toxics Pit Cleanup Act
*25208 et seq.
H & S Code Toxic Air Contaminants
*39650 et seq.
47
LLNL has completed a "Part B" permit application (LLNL, 1985a,b and 1986a,b) for
the storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste in accordance with the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (42 USC 6901 et seq.) and the Department of Health
Services, State of California (State of California, 1988). LLNL presently is operating under
interim status during the permitting process. The continued implementation of existing
procedures and the fact that NDERF would consolidate existing operations would ensure
that NDERF's waste generation would not significantly affect the environment
(University of California, 1986; LLNL, 1986a,b and 1985a,b). DOE also is considering
construction of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) that will
provide more modern hazardous waste material handling and treatment capabilities for
the entire Laboratory, which would include all waste generated in NDERF. The DWTF is
discussed in an Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. DOE, 1989).

5.5.3.5 Potential Effects on LLNL Personnel.

It is the policy of LLNL to take every
reasonable precaution to protect the health and safety of its employees. With respect to
X-Ray Laser Program operations, this means maintaining toxic exposures as low as
reasonably achievable. The NDERF project includes operational procedures and facilities
designed to prevent worker and other employee exposure (refer to Sections 2 and 5.2). Air,
surface, and bioassay monitoring programs have been established for X-Ray Laser
Program operations to ensure that the facility and operational controls are functional.
Similar techniques would be employed in NDERF. In addition, a medical surveillance
program has been implemented.
NDERF operations would be performed in accordance with a safety and health
plan. The components of the plan are listed below:
* Toxicity and material control. Literature searches are performed on
candidate chemicals to ascertain existing toxicological information.
Animal toxicity testing would be performed outside of LLNL by licensed
testing laboratories to support estimates of human toxicity and
establishment of safety limits. The toxic-material review committee would
evaluate the possibility of gaseous release of potentially toxic materials and
approve the material for safe use in engineering operations.
* Facility design. NDERF has been designed with air-handling and HEPA
filtration systems to minimize workplace exposures.
48
* Safety procedures. OSPs will continue to be defined to control those
operations that involve hazardous materials and potentially hazardous
activities.
* Employee education. Employees are informed periodically pursuant to
LLNL's Health Hazard Communication Program responsibility, which
includes data on potential exposures, results of workplace monitoring, and
material safety data sheet information.
* Monitoring program. Work-area air, work surfaces, and worker biofluids
will be monitored to assess the effectiveness of exposure-control measures.
* Work-practice review. Health and Safety technicians will observe
workers' daily practices and, as needed, suggest changes in those practices
to workers and their supervisors.
* Medical surveillance plan. A medical surveillance plan has been
established to detect early any possible occupational exposures or diseases,
provide effective care of job-related injuries, and place appropriate medical
restrictions on worker activities to maintain worker safety.
* Environmental control. Engineering and administrative controls are
established to prevent the spread of toxic materials to other laboratory
spaces and the public domain. These controls include design of the
ventilation and HEPA-filtration systems, use of containment cabinets and
hoods, safe storage of potential hazardous materials, appropriate use of
protective clothing, and safe disposal of hazardous waste.

5.5.3.6 Use of Resources.
5.5.3.6.1 Utility Systems.

NDERF would house existing operations that currently
are consuming utilities. Estimates of the total LLNL consumption of utilities include the
consumption by current X-Ray Laser Program operations. Because these operations would
be dispersed throughout the Livermore site and intermingled with other programs, it is not
possible to determine the current level of X-Ray Laser Program utility consumption. The
estimates of NDERF utility consumption are based on the design capability of the facility.
Therefore, estimated incremental impacts of NDERF over the current level of LLNL
consumption, as presented here, may be greater than what actually would be observed.
49
* Water. Between 1978 and 1988, LLNL water usage increased from
842785 m^3/y (222650000 gal/y) to 1395395 m^3/y (365650000 gal/y), a 65.6%
increase. This increased usage is the result of increased programmatic
activity and an increase in the number of LLNL personnel.
Incremental water usage during NDERF operation would be expected to be
30 700 m^3/y (8110000 gal/y), which is approximately 2.2% of the current
LLNL use rate of 1395395 m^3/y (365650000 gal/y). Water for the operation
of NDERF would be provided by the westward extension of existing mains
located between Bldgs. 121 and 131. The source of this water (as with the rest
of LLNL's water supply) would be the City of San Francisco's Hetch Hetchy
water system.
* Power. Between 1984 and 1988, LLNL electricity consumption has
increased from 250.9 GW*h/y to 304.9 GW*h/y. This represents an average
increase in consumption of 10.8 GW*h/y or approximately 3.9%/y.
It is estimated that NDERF would use 20 135 640 kW*h of electric power per
year, representing a 6.6% increase over the 1988 rate. During the
construction phase, consumption would be relatively insignificant. It is
estimated that the construction phase would use 260 000 kW*h/y or less than
1.3% of the the annual use rate. Western Area Power Administration and
Pacific Gas and Electric Company will be the suppliers of electricity used
for NDERF, as they are for the entire LLNL site.
* Natural Gas. Between 1978 and 1987, LLNL natural gas consumption
remained relatively constant within the range of 3 924 000 and
4 548 000 therms/y. NDERF and NTTC would share central plant
facilities. Based on the types and sizes of planned operations, it is
estimated that 205 000 therms of natural gas would be used annually by both
facilities. Compared to an average annual use of 4 281 685 therms, this
represents a 5.4% increase in LLNL natural gas consumption.
* Sanitary Sewer. Between 1978 and 1987, the average LLNL sewer outflow
rate has increased by 3.2% per year, due primarily to the establishment of
the new procedure in 1983 whereby cooling tower wastewater is released to
the sanitary sewer. Currently, annual outflow is 517 088 m^3. The expected
annual outflow from NDERF and NTTC would be 21 158 m^3. Since there
would be no increase in the total LLNL population, only a fraction of this
outflow would be additive to the total annual LLNL outflow. The contract
50
between LLNL and the City of Livermore allows LLNL 4.4 m3/m
-1170 gal/m) capacity in the sewage collection system.

5.5.3.6.2 Land Use.

The location of NDERF adjacent to NTTC on a portion of
newly acquired land will result in cumulative impacts. Although there are no specific
plans to locate other facilities on this land, LLNL has long-term plans to expand operations
into that portion of the newly acquired land between the western buffer zone and the
historical western boundary (LLNL, 1987b). This growth is to meet programmatic and
infrastructure needs of LLNL.
* Releases to Contaminated Soils and Groundwater. The soils and ground-
water beneath LLNL and adjacent lands are contaminated. Specific
information regarding releases that resulted in the contamination and
LLNL's remediation efforts can be found in Dresen et al., 1987; Dresen,
Nichols et al., 1987; and the recent Draft Environmental Impact Report
(University of California, 1986).
Representative soil samples were taken at the proposed NDERF/NTTC site
in December 1988, February 1989, and March 1989 and were analyzed for
organics, Soluble Threshold Limit Concentration (for characterization as
hazardous), metals, and gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity. All of the
analytical results indicated that the soil is nonhazardous and nonradio-
active and can be disposed of in a class III municipal landfill.
As discussed in the NTTC EA, groundwater underlying the NDERF/NTTC
planning area has been found to contain certain volatile organic
compounds (VOCs). The California Regional Water Quality Control
Board and the Environmental Protection Agency require that specified
investigations and groundwater cleanup operations be performed now and
in the near future. LLNL's Environmental Protection Department has
established a network of monitoring and extraction wells, and will install
groundwater treatment facilities to remove the VOCs from the ground-
water. The proposed siting of the NTTC and NDERF buildings, the road,
and the parking areas are compatible with existing groundwater plans and
with future requirements for wells and other groundwater clean up
facilities. To prevent or minimize the consequences of a release resulting
from NDERF operations, several mitigation measures will be taken. For
example:
51
- To control the amount of material that could be spilled, each
building that uses solvents would dispense from 5-gal spill^-proof
containers rather than from larger containers, such as 55-gal
drums.
- Solvents would not be stored in underground tanks.
- Waste retention tanks would be used.
- LLNL has an active spill-response program; waste accumulation
areas would have contingency plans for spills. The laboratory also
has a hazardous materials team to respond to spills.
- The extensive system of monitoring wells in place at the Livermore
site can provide data on the impact of past spills.
NDERF chemical and hazardous-material handling operations would conform to
standard operating procedures, operational and facility safety procedures, and guidelines
on the construction of hazardous material storage areas (LLNL, 1987b). Therefore, no
additional releases are anticipated to the soils or groundwater.

5.6 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS

Since NDERF would house research and development activities that currently are
being conducted at other LLNL Livermore locations, there will be no significant increase
in impacts associated with these activities. As noted in Section 5.5.1.6, the use of resources,
including water and power, will be increased slightly due to increased operations.
However, this increase will not add significant cumulative impacts to current resource
use.
52

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American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) (1986),
"Documentation of the Threshold Limit Values and Biological Exposure Indices," fifth
edition, American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Inc., Cincinnati,
Ohio.
Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) (1987), "Ozone Experience
Improves Again," Air Currents, Vol. 30, No. 8, San Francisco, California.
Bing, G.F. (1986), Directors Office Technical Staff, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Livermore, California, private communication.
California Air Pollution Control Officers Association (CAPCOA) (1987), Air Toxics
Assessment Manual. Vol. 1: Toxic Air Pollutant Source Assessment Manual for
California Air Pollution Control Districts and Applicants for Air Pollution Control
District Permits, Interagency Working Group.
Carpenter, D.W.; Sweeney, J.J.; Kasameyer, P.W;.Burklard, N.R.; Knauss, K.G.; and
Schlemon, R.J. (1984), Geology of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site and
Adjacent Areas, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California,
UCRL-53316.
Dresen, M.D.; Nickols, E.M.; Isherwood, W.F. (1987), Proposal for Pilot Ground Water
Extraction and Treatment West of LLNL, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, California, UCAR- 102 13.
Dresen, M.D.; Nichols, E.M.; McConachie, W.A.; Buchanan, KS.; and Isherwood, W.F.
(1987), Remedial Alternatives for VOCs in Ground Water West of LLNL, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California, UCAR-10202.
Elder, J.C. et al. (1986), A Guide to Radiological Accident Considerations for the Siting
and Design of DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los
Alamos, New Mexico, LA-10294-MS.
53
Freeland, G.E. (1984), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Earthquake Safety
Program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California, UCAR-
10129.
Harmathy, T.Z. (1972), "A New Look at Compartment Fires," Fire Technology, National
Fire Protection Association, Parts I and II, B, pp. 196-217 and 326-351.
Horst, L. (1988), Associate Planner, City of Livermore, private communication.
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) (1980), Limits for Intakes of
Radionuclides by Workers, Publication 30, Part 1, Pergammon Press, Elmsford, New
York.
International Conference of Building Officials (1988), Uniform Building Code, Whittier,
California.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (1985a), Hazardous Waste Operation
Plan. Livermore Site, Vol. 1-3, Livermore, California, UCAR-10228.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (1985b), Hazardous Waste Operation Plan.
Livermore Site, Parts 1-6, Livermore, California, UCAR-10228, Addendum.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (1986a), Operations Plan for New Hazardous
Waste Storage Area, Livermore, California, UCAR- 10230.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (1986b), Request to Construct New Hazardous
Waste Storage Area, Livermore, California, UCAR-10229.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (1987a), Project Design Criteria Nuclear
Directed Energy Research Facility, internal memorandum, Livermore, California.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (1987b), Site Development and Facility Plan,
Livermore, California, UCAR-10276-87.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (1987c), Health and Safety Manual, Livermore,
California, M-010.
54
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (1988a), Institutional Plan FY88-93, Livermore,
California, UCAR-10076-7.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (1988b), LLNL Emergency Preparedness Plan,
M-014.
Leitner, P. and Leitner, B. (1986), Environmental Consultants, Oakland, California,
private communication.
Lewis, R.J., Sr. and Tatken, R.L., eds (1982), Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical
Substances, Vol. 1,1980 Edition, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public
Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, Washington, D.C.
Rogozen, M. (1988), letter report, Final Screening Assessment of Carcinogenic Risk from
Routine Fugitive Releases of Air Pollutants from the Nuclear Directed Research Facility
(NDERF), prepared for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore,
California.
Scheimer, J.F. (1985), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site Seismic Safety
Program - Summary of Findings, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore,
California, UCRL-53674.
Selby, J.M. (1975), Considerations in the Assessment of the Consequences of Effluents
from Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plants, Battelle Northwest Laboratories, Richland,
Washington, BNWL-1697, Rev. 1.
Sharry, J. (1988), internal memorandum, Protection of Mesquite Way, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
Sledge, M. and Hirabayashi, J. (1987), Guidelines for Waste Accumulation Areas,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California, UCAR-10192.
State of California (1988), California Administrative Code. Division 20. Hazardous Waste
Control Law, Chapter 6.5, Article 9, Department of Health Services, State of California,
Sacramento, California.
55
Tokarz, F.J. and Shaw, G. (1980), Seismic Safety of the LLL Plutonium Facility (Building
332), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California, UCRL-52786.
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California Contract with the Department of Energy for Operation and Management of
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley,
California, SCH-85112611.
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Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories - Livermore Site, Livermore.
California, Washington, D.C., DOE/EIS-0028.
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Land for a Buffer Zone Around Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia
National Laboratory. Livermore, Washington, D.C., DOE/EA-0236.
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Environment. DOE Order 5480.XX, draft of March 20,1987, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Energy (1988a), Environmental Assessment. Nuclear Test
Technology Complex at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Washington, D.C.,
DOE/EA-0236.
U.S. Department of Energy (1988b), Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers, DOE
Order 5480.11, Washington, D.C.
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Safety Analyses of DOE Facilities. DOE Order 5481. 1B, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Energy (1989), Draft Final Environmental Impact Statement,
DOE/EIS-0133-F.
Vogt, D.K (1989), SAIC, Pleasanton, California, private communication.
56

7. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACGIH - American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
AIHA - American Industrial Hygiene Association
ARAC - Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
BAAQMD - Bay Area Air Quality Management District
CAPCOA - California Air Pollution Control Officers Association
CARB - California Air Resources Board
Class D-D - Neutral meteorological stability, day
Class D-N - Neutral meteorological stability, night
DOE - Department of Energy
DWTF - Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility
EA - Environmental Assessment
EP&RP - Emergency Preparedness and Response Program
ERPG - (LLNL) Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
HEPA - High-efficiency particulate air (filters)
HESQA - Health, Environment, Safety, and Quality Assurance
HVAC - Heating/ventilation/air conditioning (system)
ICRP - International Commission on Radiological Protection
LLNL - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LWRP - Livermore Water Reclamation Plant
MPC - Maximum permissible concentration
NDERF - Nuclear Directed Energy Research Facility
NDEW - Nuclear Directed Energy Weapon
NE PA - National Environmental Policy Act (of 1969)
NPDES - National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
NTTC - Nuclear Test Technology Center
OSP - Operational safety procedure
SNLL - Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore
WAA - Waste Accumulation Area
VOC - Volatile Organic Compounds
57

APPENDIX A

APPLICABLE ORDERS, CODES, NATIONAL STANDARDS,
LLNL STANDARDS and GUIDES
Designs, construction drawings, and specifications shall comply with all
requirements of the current issue of the DOE Order 6430. 1A, General Design Criteria.
Additional design regulations, codes, and standards follow.
DOE Orders
4700.1 Project Management System
5000.3 Unusual Occurrences Reporting System
5400.1 General Environmental Protection Program
5400.6 Hazardous and Radioactive Mixed Waste Program
5440.1C Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act
5480.1 Chapter 7 - Fire Protection Program
Chapter 12 - Prevention, Control, and Abatement of Environmental
Pollution
5480. 1B Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Program for
Department of Energy Operations
5480.3 Safety Requirements for the Packaging and Transportation of Hazardous
Materials, Hazardous Substances and Hazardous Wastes
5480.4 Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Standards
5480.5 Safety of Nuclear Facilities
5480.9 Construction Safety and Health Program
5480.10 Contractor Industrial Hygiene Program
5480.11 Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers
5481.1B Safety Analysis and Review System
5482.1B Environmental, Safety, and Health Appraisal Program
5483.1A Occupational Safety and Health Program for Government-Owned,
Contractor Operated Facilities
A-1
5484.1 Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Information
Reporting Requirements
5700.6B Quality Assurance
5820.2A Radioactive Waste Management
6430.1A General Design Criteria
Codes
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)--Code Requirements
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) -- Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code Requirements
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Uniform Building Code (ICBO)
Uniform Mechanical Code (IAPMO)
Uniform Plumbing Code (IAPMO)
National Electric Code (NEC)
State of California, Dept. of Agriculture, Grading Code of Nursery Stock
Standards
(1) Associated Air Balance Council (AABC)
(2) Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA)
(3) American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
(4) ASHRAE Standard 90A-1980, "Energy Conservation in New Building Design"'
(5) American Water Works Association (AWWA)
(6) Construction Specifications Institute (CSI)
(7) Cooling Tower Institute (CTI)
(8) National Electric Manufacturers' Association (NEMA)
(9) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), National Fire Standards
(10) Steel Boiler Industry (SBI), Division of IBR, Hydronics Institute
(11) Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association,
Inc. (SMACNA)
(12) Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. (UL) and Factory Mutual (FM) approved
equipment guide
A-2
(13) Department of Labor (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Standards (29 CFR
Part 1910) Promulgated Under P.L. 91-596, ""Occupational Safety and Health
Act" (OSHA) of 1970, as amended.
(14) Architectural Barriers Act P.L. 90-480 and FPM Regulations (41 CFR 101-96-6)
(15) Cal-Trans Highway Design Manual
(16) American Concrete Institute, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced
Concrete (ACI 318-71)
(17) American Institute of Steel Construction - Steel Construction Manual
(18) American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air Conditioning Engineers
(ASHRAE) Guide and Standard 90-75
(19) American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM)
(20) California Administrative Codes
(21) Industrial Ventilation Manual (ACGIH)
(22) Masonry Design Manual, Masonry Industry
(23) American Welding Society
(24) FPMR Subpart 101-19.6 (D47, June 1974), Accommodations for the Physically
Handicapped
(25) ANSI A117.1 (R1971)
LLNL Standards and Manuals
M-010 LLNL Health and Safety Manual
M-012 Mechanical Engineering Safety Manual
M-105 Working with Pressure at LLNL
LED61-00-01-A1 LLNL Electronics Engineering Department Safety Policy
LLNL Quality Assurance Program Guidelines
UCRL-15714 Suspended Ceiling System and Seismic Bracing Requirements
LLNL Site Development and Facilities Utilization Plan
LLNL Landscape Master Plan and Design Guidelines
LLNL Rationale for New LLNL Space Guidelines
LLNL Revised Criteria and Procedures for Security Alarm System Design, Construction
and Modifications
UCAR-10192 Guidelines for Waste Accumulation Areas
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LLNL Civil Engineering Standards
PEL-C-02440, Civil Criteria and Plant Engineering Standard
Pavement Marking, Bumpers and Signs:
LIB.PE.C.200 Parking Bumper Details
LIB.PE.C.201 Parking Stalls - 60 Degrees
LIB.PE.C.205 Traffic Directional Arrow - Straight
LIB-PE.C.209 Stop Bar and Sign Location Detail
Road and Pavement:
LIB.PE.C.400 Typical Vertical Curb
LIB.PE.C.403 Paving Header
LIB.PE.C.405 Typical Grading Section
LIB.PE.C.408 Parking Lot - Cross Section
LIB.PE.C.413 Extruded Concrete Curb
Storm and Sanitary Sewer:
LIB.PE.C.501 Trench Backfill Detail
LIB.PE.C.502 Storm Water Inlet - Section
LIB.PE.C.504 Typical Sewer Service
LIB.PE.C.506 Sanitary Sewer Clean-out - Section
LLNL Specifications for Civil Engineering Standards
Section 210 Clearing of Site
Section 250 Earthwork
Section 251 Storm Sewers
Section 256 Utility Trenching
Section 261 Paving
Section 262 Curbs and Gutters
Section 265 Pavement Markings and Signs
Section 273 Sanitary Sewers
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LLNL Architectural Standards
PEL.A.01088 Room Numbering System
PEL.A. 1 Raised Floor Systems
PEL.A.2 Doors and Hardware
PEL.A.07514 Built-Up Roofing
LLNL Mechanical Standards
PLM 78-000- 010D M90 Cathodic Protection Details
011D M91 Cathodic Protection Details
013D M40 Building Service Valve Box for 8" and 10" LCW
015D M92 Cathodic Protection Details
016D M45 Valve Box Details
017D M100 Fire Hydrant Installation
022D M41 Building Service Valve Box for 4" and 6" LCW
024D M69 Building Service Piping Trench
PLM 85-000- 002D M26 Branch Connection to New CW Mains
003D M42 Fire Riser Valve Box (6" - 8")
PLM 83-000- 001D M32 Utility Main Valve Box
PEL-M-1.02 Pipe and Valve Identification
PEL-M-1.04 Plant Alarmed Equipment
PEL-M-1.05 Procedure for Sterilizing Water Lines
PEL-M-3.03 Piping for Mechanical Systems in Building
PEL-M-3.04 Valves for Mechanical Systems in Building
PEL-M-5.04 Water Treatment Chemical Feed Unit Installation
PEL-M-5.05 Line Blind and Space Flanges
PEL-M-6.03 Single/Dual Temp. Domestic Hot Water Heater Connection Details
PEL-M-6.06 Single/Dual Temp. Domestic Hot Water Heater Connection
Details
PEL-M-8.01 Automatic Gas-Fired Firebox-Type Hot Water Boiler
PEL-M-8.03 Standard Cap for Boiler Stack
PEL-M-9.01 LCW Control System for Centrifugal Water Chillers
PEL-M-9.04 LCW control System for Reciprocating Water Chillers
PEL-M-10.01 Fan Bearings
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PEL-M-15.02 Pressure Gauges
PEL-M-15.03 Thermometers
PEL-L-3.02 Landscape Design Standard/Irrigation Details
PEL-M-02610 Utility Distribution Piping
PEL-M-02645 Valves for Mechanical Utility Systems
PEL-M-02676 Backflow Prevention in Potable Water
PEL-M-02686 Gas Pressure Regulating and Metering
PEL-M-02696 Clearance for Overhead Utility Piping
PEL-M- 11009 Plant Engineering Numbering System
PEL-M- 15330 Fire Sprinkler Riser
PEL-M-5.03 Laboratory Industrial Gas Service Drops
PEL-M-5.05 Industrial Gas Cylinder Manifolds and Installation
PEL-M-5. 10 Single Cartridge Filter Assembly for C.W.
PEL-M-5. 12 Building Air Receivers
PEL-M-6.02 Emergency Shower and Eye Wash
PEL-M-6.03 Clean-outs and Floor Drains
PEL-M-9.02 Artificial Loads for Air Conditioning Testing
PEL-M-10.05 Stackhead for Vertical Exhaust Ducts
PEL-M-11.02 PVC Centrifugal Exhaust Fan for Chemical Services
PEL-M-1 1.03 PVC Axial Exhaust Fan for Chemical Service
PEL-M-13201 Hazardous Substance Storage Structures
LLNL Brief Description of Mechanical Utility and Cathode
Protection Systems, LLNL
Specifications - Mechanical
Section 222 Utility Trenching
Section 260 Utility Distribution Systems
Section 261 Utility Distribution Piping
Section 262 Utility Valves
Section 263 Valves Boxes
Section 264 Utility System Identification
Section 265 Painting Piped Utility Material
Section 266 Cathodic Protection
Section 267 Corrosion Protection
Section 269 Fusion Epoxy Lining and Coating
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Section 269 Flushing, Testing, Disinfecting and Placing in Operation
Section 1500 General Requirements
Section 1510 Plumbing and Process Piping Systems
Section 1520 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems
Section 1521 Testing, Balancing, and Component Checkout
Section 1530 Insulation for Piping and Duct Work
Section 1540 Fire Suppression Sprinkler System
Section 1541 Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System
LLNL Electrical Standards
PEL-E 1 General Electrical Requirements
PEL-E2 Panelboard and Circuit Numbering
PEL-E3 Panelboard
PEL-E4 Construction Material
PEL-E5 Grounding for Laboratory Buildings
PEL-E6 Electrical Power Receptacles and Devices
PEL-E7 Dry Type Transformers
PEL-E8 Motors
PEL-E9 Motor Control
PEL-E10 Emergency Power
PEL-E11 Unit Substations
PEL-E12 Building Lighting
PEL-E13 Exterior Lighting
PEL-E14 Fire Alarm Standards
PEL-E15 Underground Ducts, Manholes, and High Voltage Cables
PEL-E17 Electric Panel Schedule and One Line Diagrams
PEL-E18 Phase Sequence and Transformer Connections
PEL-E-16061 Panelboard and Circuit Numbering
PEL-1-13300 Energy Metering
LLNL Industrial Electronics Standards
PEL-1-16776 Evacuation Page Design and Installation
PEL-1-16777 Fire Alarm Design Standards
PEL- 1-02 Fire Alarm Standards
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PLI85-099-001E Manhole Communication Ducting Network
PLK85-000-0010 Loud Speaker Details
PEL-1-16700 Communication Room for Typical Building
PEL-1-02803 Conduit and Raceway Distribution System
LLNL Landscaping Standards
PEL-L-1.01 Trees
PEL-L-1.02 Shrubs
PEL-L-1.03 Ground Covers
PEL-L-1.04 Specimens and Non-Standard Material
PEL-L-2.01 Tree and Shrub Planting
PEL-L-2.02 Lawn Planting
PEL-L-2.03 Ground Cover Planting
PEL-L-2.04 Container Planting
PEL-L-3.01 Miscellaneous Landscaping Details
PEL-L-3.02 Landscaping Irrigation Details
LLNL Specifications for Landscaping
Section 281 Irrigation Systems
Section 290 Headerboards and Gravel
Section 292 Soil Preparation
Section 293 Lawn
Section 295 Trees, Shrubs and Groundcover
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